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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In 1996 the Egyptian Court of Cassation annulled the marriage of scholar Nasr 
Hamed Abou Zayd. The court ruled that through his blasphemous religious 
statements, he had committed apostasy. Four decades later, in 2007 the Egyptian 
Administrative Court did not recognize the conversion of 22 citizens from Islam to 
Christianity considering it an act of apostasy not recognizable by Islamic Shari'a. 
Egyptian authorities have arrested citizens converting from Islam citing that their 
apostasy was considered a belittlement of Islam and hence a violation of Egyptian 
Criminal Law. These are but just three examples and simply the tip of the iceberg of 
the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law and its effect on the lives of citizens 
and their right to freedom of belief and worship. This thesis will analyze limitations 
on freedom of belief in Egypt through an analysis of the legal framework of the right 
to abandon Islam, apostasy. In the Thesis, through a thorough analysis of Egyptian 
jurisprudence in regards to apostasy, we will understand that Egyptian judges 
wrongfully consider the rules of apostasy as an undisputed part of Islamic Shari’a and 
therefore a part of Egyptian public policy that is legally binding. The Diversity of 
opinion in Islamic Shari’a in regards to apostasy will be analyzed to prove that its 
rules are in fact disputed and should not be applied as part of Egyptian public policy. 
The Thesis will then move to see the danger of the legal framework of apostasy as it 
is used for political means. Finally, after understanding the framework of apostasy we 
will attempt to understand the choice of the Egyptian judges to apply the most 
conservative understanding of Islamic Shari’a in regards to apostasy and 
consequently choose to limit freedom of belief and violate Egypt’s international 
obligations. 
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I. Introduction: 
 
In 1996 the Egyptian Court of Cassation annulled the marriage of scholar Nasr 
Hamed Abou Zayd. The court ruled that through his blasphemous religious 
statements, he had committed apostasy.1 Four decades later, in 2007 the Egyptian 
Administrative Court did not recognize the conversion of 22 citizens from Islam to 
Christianity considering it an act of apostasy not recognizable by Islamic Shari'a.2 
Egyptian authorities have arrested citizens converting from Islam citing that their 
apostasy was considered a belittlement of Islam and hence a violation of Egyptian 
Criminal Law.3 These are but just three examples and simply the tip of the iceberg of 
the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law and its effect on the lives of citizens 
and their right to freedom of belief and worship. 
The relationship between freedom of belief within the society and the state is 
an overwhelming topic that has been subjected to great academic debate. The 
questions that often arise when discussing this relationship are constantly increasing 
in number due to the diversity of the societal context in which the legal right to 
freedom of belief and worship functions. In an attempt to add to this massive 
academic field, scholars have delved into a more specific analysis of the different 
topics, terms, laws and legal consequences. Countries that claim Islamic legitimacy, 
apply Islamic law or are of a majority Muslim population are of special interest to 
academics studying freedom of belief and worship as well as the various limitations 
set on it. The clearest limitation on freedom of belief and worship is the very much 
intrusive limitation on the right to abandon a religion, whether for the sake of another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Maurits	  Berger	  ,	  Secularizing	  Interreligious	  Law	  In	  Egypt,	  (2005)	  available	  at	  
http://dare.uva.nl/	  
document/196604.	  
2HossamBahgat	  and	  Joe	  Stork,	  Prohibited	  Identities,	  the	  Egyptian	  Initiative	  for	  Personal	  
Rights	  and	  
Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (Nov.	  2007),	  available	  at	  http://eipr.org/en/report/2007/11/01/261.	  
3Id.	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or not. This thesis will analyze limitations on freedom of belief in Egypt through an 
analysis of the legal framework of the right to abandon Islam, apostasy.   
Egyptian statutory law is silent in regards to the issue of abandoning Islam or 
'apostasy' as it is called in Islamic and Egyptian Jurisprudence.4Nullapoena sine 
lege (Latin: no penalty without a law) is a basic legal principle considered a building 
block for rule of law within states.5 The basic consequence from applying such a 
principle is that the silence of the law in regards to an act entails that the act is 
allowed; hence, the performance of such act should not lead to punishment. It would 
however be superficial to assume that the silence of the law in regards to apostasy 
automatically means that it is allowed to all citizens without any limitations or 
consequences. In fact the analysis of Egyptian jurisprudence shows that in Egypt 
apostasy is not allowed and leads to a number of legal consequences. This thesis 
argues that the Egyptian legal framework in regards to the non-recognition of 
apostasy and the application of its legal consequences is in violation of Egyptian 
international obligation according to article 18 of the International Convention for 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
In Classical Islamic Jurisprudence apostasy is defined as the abandonment of 
Islam. It is wrongfully argued that mainstream thought within classical Islamic 
jurisprudence states that apostasy can take place through the conversion to another 
religion, or atheism, or making statements that are considered blasphemous towards 
to Islam.6 Moreover, it is also wrongfully argued that mainstream thought in classical 
Islamic Jurisprudence believes that committing apostasy leads to legal consequences 
in regards to personal status, for example divorce from spouse, losing the right to 
inherit and the control over ones property.7 This wrongful understanding of Shari’a is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4Maurits	  Berger,	  Apostasy	  and	  Public	  Policy	  in	  Contemporary	  Egypt:	  An	  Evaluation	  of	  Recent	  
Cases	  from	  Egypt’s	  Highest	  Courts,	  25	  Hum.	  Rts.	  Q.,	  720	  (2003).	  
5Nulla	  Poena	  Sine	  Lege	  Law	  &	  Legal	  Definition,	  available	  at	  
http://definitions.uslegal.com/n/nulla-­‐poena-­‐sine-­‐lege/	  
6	  Rudolph	  Peters	  and	  Gert	  J.	  J.	  De	  Vrie,	  Apostasy	  in	  Islam	  Rudolph	  Peters	  and	  Gert	  J.	  J.	  De	  
Vries,	  17	  Die	  Welt	  des	  Islams	  1	  (Nov.	  2011).	  
7Id.	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adhered to and implemented by the Egyptian Legal System. Egyptian Courts do not 
recognize apostasy through conversion from Islam to another religion. Egyptian 
courts apply the legal consequences of apostasy on the apostate’s personal status. 
Egyptian penal codes criminalize the act of apostasy through blasphemy and Egyptian 
Courts have even acknowledged on occasion that blasphemy is an automatic 
commitment of apostasy. The Egyptian Courts and authorities argue that this 
understanding of apostasy in Islamic Shari’a which they are applying as part of the 
undisputed rules of Islamic Shari’a.8 This is important given that the Courts see the 
application of these rules as a legal obligation and this is made especially important 
given the main role that Shari'a has within Egyptian public policy.  
This thesis will challenge the argument out forward by the Egyptian judiciary. 
This thesis argues that Egyptian courts not recognizing apostasy and applying of the 
legal consequences of apostasy on the apostate are in fact illegal limitations on the 
right to freedom of belief and worship which Egypt is obligated to uphold according 
to the ICCPR. Firstly, this thesis argues that the rules regarding apostasy and its legal 
consequences are disputed rules within Islamic Shari’a and jurisprudence; therefore, 
they should not part of Egyptian Public Policy and do not have to be applied 
according to Egyptian law. Secondly, this thesis argues that state authorities use the 
legal framework for apostasy to prevent any departure from mainstream state backed 
readings of religion or politics. Thirdly, the thesis argues that the majority of 
Egyptian judges choose to apply the most conservative understanding of apostasy 
rules in Islamic Shari’a by wrongfully choosing to use the legal precedent as a 
binding source of law and by consciously not researching the diversity of opinion in 
Islamic Shari’a in regards to apostasy.  
The thesis is composed of six chapters. Each chapter has a main purpose and 
argument. Chapter I addresses the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law, 
including the application of the consequences of apostasy and not allowing apostasy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Berger,	  Apostasy	  and	  Public	  Policy	  in	  Contemporary	  Egypt:	  An	  Evaluation	  of	  Recent	  Cases	  
from	  Egypt’s	  Highest	  Courts,	  supra	  note	  4.	  
4	  
	  
through conversion. To understand the legal framework this chapter will discuss the 
current stance of Egyptian Statutory Laws and courts in regards to both types of 
apostasy in Egyptian law, apostasy through abandoning Islam and apostasy through 
blasphemy, and their legal consequences. The chapter is divided into four sections. 
The first section discusses the stance of the Egyptian Constitutional law on apostasy 
and the role of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law.  The second section discusses the 
stance of the Egyptian Administrative laws, including statutory law and court 
practice, on apostasy, specifically in relation to not allowing the recognition of 
apostasy through conversion from Islam. The third section discusses the stance of 
Egyptian Criminal laws, including statutory law and court practice, in regards to 
apostasy, specifically in regards to apostasy through committing blasphemy. The 
fourth section discusses the stance of Egyptian Personal Status laws, including 
statutory law and court practice, in regards to apostasy, specifically the application of 
the legal consequences of apostasy on personal status. All the sections will lead to a 
full understanding of the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law, in both 
codified law and judicial practice.   
Chapter II of the thesis addresses very briefly the stance of international law 
on apostasy, specifically article 18 of the International Convention for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) pertaining to freedom of belief and the Egyptian reservation 
on the convention.     
Afterwards, Chapter III addresses the justification put forward by Egyptian 
Authorities and Courts for not allowing the recognition of apostasy through 
conversion from Islam and the application of the legal consequences for apostasy. 
This chapter discusses how Egypt considers the rules pertaining to not allowing 
apostasy and the application of its legal consequences as part of the undisputed 
principles Islamic Shari’a, which are legally a main part of its public policy that must 
be enforced. Therefore, allowing it legally to limit freedom of belief by applying that 
legal framework of apostasy.   
5	  
	  
In Chapter IV of the thesis, the justification of the Egyptian state which was 
discussed in the previous chapter will be challenged. Chapter IV aims to prove the 
rules regarding not allowing the recognition of apostasy and the application of the 
legal consequences of apostasy are in fact disputed rules in Islamic Shari’a and are 
only opinions of some Islamic jurists.  This chapter addresses the diversity of opinion 
in Islamic Shari’a in regards to the act of apostasy itself, in both its types, and its legal 
consequences on personal status. This chapter also addresses how Islamic Shari’a 
calls for religious freedom and tolerance and prohibits religious coercion. 
Chapter V addresses the use of legal framework of apostasy, specifically its 
legal consequences, as a legal tool against religious and political opposition. This 
chapter discusses the use of the criminal articles regarding blasphemy against 
religious converts and members of religious minorities. It also discusses the use of 
apostasy as a legal tool against political and religious dissent and how the state, 
represented in the Public Prosecution office has a semi-monopoly of over referring 
apostasy cases to the judiciary, and hence on when the legal framework of apostasy 
will be applied. 
Finally, chapter VI addresses the choice of the Egyptian judges to applying 
the most conservative rules of apostasy in Islamic Shari’a. The chapter discusses one 
of the cases that are an exception to Egyptian jurisprudence in regards to apostasy, the 
Blasphemy case of Adel Imam in the Agouza Court. The case applies a lenient 
understanding of apostasy rules, which shows that Egyptian law is accepting of such 
an approach to apostasy and that the majority of the judges choose to apply the 
conservative rules. The chapter argues that judges wrongfully use legal precedent and 
choose not research the diversity of opinion in Islamic Shari’a to ensure continuation 
of the application of the conservative rules of apostasy. 
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II. Understanding the Legal Framework of Apostasy in Egyptian Law: 
This chapter will aim to critically analyze the legal framework of apostasy in 
Egyptian law. For the aim of the analysis the codified law and courts’ practice 
pertaining to apostasy will be examined. The chapter will start off by stating general 
theories applicable to the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law. Afterwards 
we will move to understand the legal framework of apostasy in the different fields of 
law and understand more how the general theories are applied in the legal system, 
both codified law and court jurisprudence. 
A. General Observations Regarding the Egyptian Legal Framework of 
Apostasy: 
As stated earlier, Egyptian law does not directly and explicitly regulate apostasy. Still 
research and analysis of Egyptian laws and jurisprudence show a strong presence of 
legal rules regarding apostasy.  Researching and analyzing Egyptian laws and court 
rulings in regards to apostasy leads to a number of important general theories 
pertaining to the issue.  
The first general observation regarding the Egyptian legal framework of 
apostasy is that the issue of apostasy can rise in all fields of Egyptian law. The legal 
framework of apostasy is clearly fragmented. In Islamic Shari’a itself the rules of 
apostasy are fragmented in the different field; therefore, this fragmentation is also 
present in the legal framework of apostasy as Islamic Shari’a must be applied in all 
fields of Egyptian law. As will be discussed in details in this chapter, the issue of 
apostasy arises in the different fields of Egyptian law in a diversity of ways specific 
to each one of them. For example, the issue of apostasy appears in administrative law 
in the cases of attempting to change the religious affiliation of the citizen in his/her 
identification card, it rises in criminal law in the cases of blasphemy and it rises in 
personal status law in the issue of marriage, inheritance and others.  Because there is 
no codified law the courts do not go back to a specific written article, except the 
constitutional one regarding Islamic Shari’a as a main source of legislation in 
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Egyptian law. In the end all the different courts in the various fields of law apply 
what they wrongfully understand as the undisputed rules of Islamic Shari’a in regards 
to apostasy, as that is the only legal source for rules on apostasy. Secondly, the role of 
Islamic Shari’a as the base of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt proves the 
existence of a legal duality in Egypt, the written codified law, what can be called the 
‘visible law’ and the un unwritten applied law, which can be called  the ‘invisible 
law’. The visible law does not mention apostasy. It gives the impression that religious 
conversion is not regulated or criminalized. The invisible law, the one that emerges 
from looking holistically at how courts interpret the rules in different fields shows 
otherwise.  
The second general observation regarding the Egyptian legal framework of 
apostasy is that the duality and fragmentation serve the function of policing religious 
belief without formally challenging relevant international human rights norms, in 
particular article 18 of the ICCPR. The duality and fragmentation insures that there is 
a legal way, in every field of the law, to eliminate any form of external expression of 
apostasy, whether through conversion from Islam or blasphemy, without having 
Egypt in breach of its international obligations.  
B. Legal Consequences of Apostasy in Egypt: 
This Section will answer a number of questions with the aim of understanding the 
legal consequences of apostasy in Egyptian law. What is the definition of apostasy in 
Egyptian law? What are the different legal consequences of apostasy? How does 
committing apostasy affect the life of the apostate? What articles in Egyptian 
administrative, criminal and personal status laws are of importance to understand the 
legal framework of apostasy in Egypt? With the lack of a specific article in Egyptian 
law defining apostasy and its legal consequences, these questions will be answered 
through the analysis of the courts’ rulings in cases regarding the legal consequences 
of apostasy. Moreover, to understand these courts’ rulings we will examine the legal 
provisions in administrative, criminal and personal status laws that are related to the 
legal consequences of apostasy. The coming parts of this section aim to elaborate on 
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both theories stated in the previous section of this chapter. Through the analysis of the 
different fields of Egyptian law and their courts’ rulings it will be clearer how the role 
of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law is the base for the entire legal framework of 
apostasy. Moreover, the analysis will also show how Egyptian law and courts are 
only concerned with the internal belief of the person if it takes any external form. 
This section adopts the hierarchal construction of law offered by mainstream 
Egyptian academic. Consequently, we will first examine the Egyptian constitutional 
law and its relationship to apostasy, including the role of Islamic Shari’a in it. This 
will show the vital role Islamic Shari’a plays in Egyptian law, which is essential in 
understating how it is the legal base for the legal framework of apostasy. Afterwards, 
the Egyptian administrative laws related to apostasy will be examined, including the 
rulings of the Egyptian Administrative Courts on cases regarding the consequences of 
apostasy. Later, the Egyptian Penal Code related to apostasy will be examined, 
including the rulings of the Egyptian Criminal Courts regarding apostasy. Finally, the 
Egyptian Personal Status laws related to apostasy will be examined, including the 
practice of the Egyptian Personal Status Courts in cases related to the legal 
consequences of apostasy. The examination of these fields will show how the two 
general theories stated earlier are applied in all sections of Egyptian law pertaining to 
apostasy. 
1. Egyptian Constitutional Law: 
Understanding Egyptian constitutional law is of the utmost importance, since it is the 
guiding law of the state, to understanding of apostasy in Egyptian law. The Egyptian 
constitutions, current Constitution, do not have a provision regarding apostasy. 
However, the status of Islam and Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian constitutional law is of 
importance to the understanding of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt. 
Understanding that status will help in understanding how it makes Islamic Shari’a the 
base of the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law. 
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According to the current Constitution, drafted by the Committee of 50 
Representatives of the People that was appointed to amend the suspended constitution 
of 2012,9 the principles of Islamic Shari’a are the main source of legislation in Egypt. 
Article 2 of the Constitution states the following: “Islam is the religion of the state 
and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic Shari’a are the principle 
source of legislation.”10 
 Islamic Shari’a, and not just Islam as a religion, was first mentioned as a 
main source of legislation in the 1971 constitution.11 Since then, principles of Islamic 
Shari’a have been a main part of Egyptian constitutional law. In the 1980 
amendments to the Egyptian constitution the principles of Islamic Shari’a were stated 
to be “the main source of legislation” and not just “a main source of legislation”.12 
Most recently, in the 2012 constitution insured that Islam is the religion of the state 
and in article 2 insured that the principles of Islamic Shari’a are the main source of 
legislation.13 Uniquely the 2012 constitution included a definition to the phrase 
“principles of Islamic Shari’a” in article 219. The article states that “The principles of 
Islamic Shari’a include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, 
and credible sources accepted within in Sunni doctrines and by the larger 
community.”14 The current Constitution removed article 219 defining the phrase 
‘principles of Islamic Shari’a’ and leaving only article 2.15 Consequently, the legal 
definition of the phrase will be the one put forward by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Egypt's	  Draft	  Constitution	  2013	  -­‐	  Unofficial	  Translation,	  available	  at	  	  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201312100582.html	  
10Id.	  	  
11	  Clark	  B.	  Lombardi	  and	  Nathan	  J.	  Brown,	  Do	  Constitutions	  Requiring	  Adherence	  to	  Shari'a	  
Threaten	  Human	  Rights?	  How	  Egypt's	  Constitutional	  Court	  Reconciles	  Islamic	  Law	  with	  the	  
Liberal	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  21	  Am.	  U.	  Int'l	  L.	  Rev.,	  379-­‐435	  (2006).	  
12Id.	  	  
13Final	  Draft	  Constitution	  11	  (2012),	  available	  at	  http://www.democracy-­‐
reporting.org/files/egypt_draft_constitution_unofficial_translation_dri.pdf	  
14Id.	  
15Supra	  note	  9.	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The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt defined the principles of Islamic 
Shari’a as scriptural commands of absolute certainty in regards to its authenticity and 
meaning.16 The Court takes the Qur’an as an authentic source of Islamic Shari’a but it 
has no clear method of identifying the authenticity of a specific Hadith it is using as a 
base for a ruling. In the case of an ambiguous meaning for an authentic text, the court 
requires that the interpretation of the specific authentic source is applied by the 
majority of the Islamic jurists throughout history. Therefore, the court requires that 
the principles of Islamic Shari’a be based on authentic texts in both source and 
meaning.17 
Another constitutional article that is of importance to the understanding the 
legal framework of apostasy in Egypt is the article regarding freedom of belief. In the 
current Constitution article 64 states that “Freedom of belief is absolute. The freedom 
of practicing religious rituals and establishing places of worship for the followers of 
revealed religions is a right organized by law.”18 
These constitutional provisions, which will be explored further in coming 
parts, show the essential role Islamic Shari’a plays in Egyptian law. Moreover, these 
provisions are used as bases for the court rulings regarding apostasy, showing the 
how the role of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law is the base for the legal framework of 
apostasy. Therefore, it is of importance to bare them in mind while discussing the 
other fields of law in Egypt and their legal provisions and rulings in regards to 
apostasy and its legal consequences.  
2. Egyptian Administrative Law: 
After looking the Egyptian Constitutional law and its legal provisions that can be 
related to apostasy, we move to examine in this part the Egyptian administrative law 
and the practice of the Administrative courts in regards to apostasy and its legal 
consequences. What legal provisions of the Egyptian Administrative law are of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16Supra	  note	  11.	  
17Id.	  	  
18Supra	  note	  9.	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relationship to the legal consequences of apostasy? What are the rulings of the 
Egyptian Administrative Courts regarding cases of apostasy and its legal 
consequences? The examination of Egyptian administrative law and jurisprudence in 
regards to apostasy will show how the role of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law is the 
base for the legal framework of apostasy in this field of law. Moreover, it will show 
how this field of law only deals with external apostasy and is not concerned with the 
internal beliefs of the citizens. 
The Egyptian Administrative courts mainly deal with the issue of apostasy in 
cases regarding the conversion from Islam. This issue exists since the Egyptian 
administrative law mandates citizens to mention their religion in their required 
computerized identification cards.19 The law also requires the citizens to inform the 
state of any change in their information.20The relationship between apostasy and 
administrative law through the computerized identification cards will be examined in 
the first part of this section. In the second part of this section we will look at how the 
Egyptian Administrative Courts also dealt with the issue of apostasy in regards to 
administrative cases that require the examination personal status laws. 
a.  Egyptian Administrative Law and Conversion from Islam:  
Egyptian law requires all citizens to obtain computerized national identification cards 
by the age of 16. Within these computerized identification cards, citizens are required 
to state their religion while choosing only from the three monotheistic religions: 
Islam, Christianity and Judaism.21 The issue of apostasy in administrative law rises 
when a Muslim citizen attempts to change the religion in their identification card. 
Article 47 of law 143 put forth in 1994, which deals with civil status, enables citizens 
to change information in their identification card as long as they have supporting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19Karlijn	  van	  der	  Voort	  ,	  EGYPT’S	  SUPREME	  ADMINISTRATIVE	  COURT	  DENIES	  
CONSTITUTIONAL	  RIGHTS	  TO	  BAHÁ’Í	  RELIGIOUS	  MINORITY,	  (2007)	  
http://works.bepress.com/karlijn_van_der_voort/1/	  
20Id.	  	  
21Id.	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papers from the appropriate authorities.22 The change of the information takes place 
through the Civil Status Department of the Ministry of Interior. The Civil Status 
Department of the Ministry of Interior does not allow for conversion from Islam 
stating that since the codified law does not regulate the issue, then Islamic law should 
be applied as stated in article 1 of the civil code.23 This shows how the Civil Status 
Department uses role of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law as the base for dealing with 
apostasy and disallowing it. 
In the codified Egyptian administrative laws the issue of religious conversion 
is only mention mentioned in terms of conversion to Islam. Law 70 of 1964, which 
addresses the fees of registration and authentication; states that certificates regarding 
conversion to Islam are without fees. Moreover, the office of the public notary is 
responsible, as stated in law 68 of 1947, to authenticate the information of all 
Egyptian citizens, including the conversion to Islam. The internal regulations of the 
Public Notary include a chapter regarding procedures that should be followed before 
the authentication of the conversion to Islam.24 There is no equivalent to these 
procedures and laws in regards to the conversion from Islam.  
A Citizen's identification card is an essential requirement for a functioning life 
in Egypt. For example, without an identification card, a citizen cannot legally work, 
obtain health insurance or have a passport issued. Moreover, citizens can be stopped 
in the street by the police and be asked for their identification card at any moment and 
without cause. In the case of the unavailability of the card the citizen should be 
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  and	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  civil	  code	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  that	  “…In	  the	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  a	  provision	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applicable,	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  natural	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  of	  equity.”	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  Civil	  Code,	  Art.	  1,	  
available	  at	  http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/Egypt/Civil%20Law.pdf	  
24Id.	  	  The	  procedures	  included	  in	  this	  chapter	  state	  that	  the	  convert	  has	  to	  be	  at	  least	  16	  
years	  old	  and	  must	  file	  a	  request	  to	  the	  ministry	  of	  interior	  after	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  the	  ministry	  should	  
arrange	  a	  meeting	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  of	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  original	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  convert.	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  is	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  and	  
recognized.	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arrested. If the citizen is asked for their identification card and is found to not be 
carrying it, then the law states that they should be arrested25 
Lastly, it is stated within the application for the identification card: that the 
inclusion of false information is considered forgery and is made punishable by the 
articles of the penal code26 
b. The Practice of the Administrative Courts: 
 
1) The Practice of the Administrative Courts and the Recognition of the 
Conversion from Islam in Identification Cards: 
The administrative judiciary rules in all cases in which a state administrative body is 
involved.27 Consequently, The Egyptian administrative courts deal with the concept 
of apostasy when a case is filed by a convert from Islam against the Ministry of 
Interior. As stated earlier, The Civil Status Department of the Ministry of Interior 
refuses to authenticate conversion from Islam arguing that it is not allowed by Islamic 
law. Moreover, cases are filed by many members of the Baha’i religion because the 
state refuses to acknowledge their religion in the identification cards and sees it as 
apostasy.28 
The stance of the Egyptian administrative courts in regards to recognition of 
conversion from Islam in identification cards has been almost consistent since the 
early 1980s. Since the 1980s, the court ruled that The Civil Status Department of the 
Ministry of Interior is not obliged to recognize or honor requests for religious 
conversion from Islam. Only between 2004 and 2007 did the court, under Judge 
Farouq Abdel Qader, altered its rulings and ruled that the Ministry of Interior is in 
fact obliged to recognize and authenticate the conversion from Islam, but only in such 
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  Judiciary,	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cases of reconversion to Christianity. These rulings were later reversed.29 The legal 
base for both types of rulings and how it is related to the role of Islamic Shari’a in 
Egyptian law and the states’ concern with only external expression of apostasy will 
be discussed in the next section. 
a) The Non-Recognition of Conversion from Islam:  
As far back as at least the early 1980s, the Egyptian administrative courts have 
consistently ruled that the Ministry of Interior is not obliged to authenticate the 
conversion of a citizen from Islam. The court states that in accordance with the civil 
law and the personal status law; Islamic Shari’a must be applied in the issue of 
conversion. The courts state that, although there is no codified law dealing with this 
issue, Islamic Shari’a does not allow apostasy, which includes conversion from 
religion. In April 2007, the administration court ruled on 22 cases filled by citizens 
that wanted to return to Christianity after converting to Islam. The court stated that 
the Civil Status Department should not recognize the re-conversion to Christianity 
stating that “"to accept the return of someone who abandons the Islamic religion to a 
different religious affiliation is an assault on the Islamic religion he had endorsed."30 
Moreover, the court stated that conversion is not acceptable because it cannot be 
considered an expression of freedom of belief but rather of manipulation of religion, 
which is deemed unacceptable. In addition, in the rulings of April 2007, the court 
restated a standard principle, which was that freedom of belief must not undermine 
public order. The court stated that since Islamic Shari’a, which prohibits apostasy, is 
part of public order; the state cannot recognize conversion from Islam. An example of 
the stance of the court can be seen in a ruling in 2001 when the court stated that 
“Although the constitution guarantees freedom of belief and the freedom to perform 
religious rites, this constitution has taken Islamic Shari`a as the principal source of 
legislation including the provisions related to apostasy."31 Another agreed upon 
reasoning used by administrative courts can also be seen in a case in 2008. In this 
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case; it was stated that the freedom to convert from one religion to another is 
guaranteed to everyone except Muslims. The court stated that freedom to practice 
religious rituals is limited by public order and morals and the principles of Islam. 
Moreover, the court stated that public order is defined based on the official religion of 
the state, which is Islam. The fact that it is a main source of legislation and the 
religion of the majority of the citizens also plays a large role in the matter of public 
order.  Therefore, conversion from Islam is not allowed as it constitutes apostasy in 
Islamic law which is the foundation of public policy.32It is clear that the consistent 
base for not allowing the acknowledgment of the apostasy is based on the role Islamic 
Shari’a plays in Egyptian law. Moreover, it is also clear that in these cases the court is 
not concerned with the change of internal beliefs of the citizen but is concerned with 
the external expression of such an apostasy, which is through changing the religious 
affiliation in the identification card. 
b) The Exceptions to the Established Jurisprudence: 
On the 9th of February, 2008, the Supreme Administrative court issued the most 
recent ruling that can be considered an exception to the established Jurisprudence. 
The court ruled in favor of an appeal filed by a citizen wanted to return to Christianity 
after converting to Islam. The court ruled that the Ministry of Interior is obliged to 
include the correct information in the identification card of the citizen. The ruling 
stated that the legislator throughout the different laws aimed to ensure that the correct 
information was added in to the identification card so that the citizen would receive 
the right treatment, for examples in matters of personal status where treatment is 
based on the religion of the citizen. The court stated that the Ministry of Interior 
should include the true religion of the citizen as well as her previous ones. Put simply, 
the court ruled that the citizen’s identification card should state that she is a Christian 
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who was previously a Muslim.33 The court also stated that the inclusion of wrong 
information in the identification card is in fact against public order. The court stated 
that the inclusion of wrong information disturbs public order as the person will have 
to fake his religious affiliation in front of the society which can be potentially 
dangerous. An example could be, having an apostate marry a Muslim woman because 
his identification card states that he is a Muslim. The court went on to state that the 
refusal to add the correct information in the identification card is a breach of law 143 
of 1994.  
Earlier a similar exception to the established jurisprudence also took place 
between April 2004 and April 2007. Within this period, the Human Rights Watch and 
the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights documented at least 22 cases in which the 
court ruled in favor of the convert. The logic of the court is very similar to that of the 
2008 ruling. The difference between these cases and the most recent case of 2008 is 
that the court did not require the Ministry of Interior to include the previous religion 
of the convert in their identification card. Within this period in a ruling in 2005, the 
court uniquely mentioned the concept of religious coercion. The court stated that 
allowing conversion from Islam is in accordance with Islamic Shari’a as it prohibits 
coercion. Moreover, the court disputed the arguments made by the officers of the 
Civil Status Department in calling the converts apostates. The court stated that 
“Islamic jurisprudence only considers an "apostate" deserving chastisement to be a 
Muslim who repudiates Islam and "who finds comfort in disbelief."34 The court 
required the Ministry of Interior to include the correct current information within the 
Identification Card of the citizen without including their previous religion; hence, 
constituting a much tolerant and accepting approach. This case is the perfect 
representation of the court looking at the different concepts in Islamic law that can be 
associated with the issue of apostasy, for example the prohibition of coercion. Even in 
these exceptions to the norm the legal logic is based on Islamic Shari’a and how with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Stating	  that	  the	  citizen	  was	  previously	  a	  Muslim	  in	  her	  identification	  card	  puts	  her	  in	  risk	  
of	  facing	  discrimination	  due	  to	  the	  intolerant	  society	  and	  possibly	  facing	  social	  punishment	  
for	  being	  an	  apostate	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  some.	  	  Id.	  	  
34Id.	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the lack of a provision discussing apostasy it is the sources of the applicable legal 
rules. 
In both the established jurisprudence and the exception to it the court deals 
apostasy based on rules of Islamic Shari’a and that is based on the vital role Islamic 
Shari’a plays in Egyptian law. Moreover, in established jurisprudence regarding 
apostasy in administrative law the court is only concerned with the external apostasy 
and does not care about what the actual internal beliefs of the citizens is. Only in the 
exceptional change in the jurisprudence does the court care about what the internal 
beliefs of the citizens are. These exceptions are so minor that it does not change the 
stance of Egyptian court in regards to only being concerned with external apostasy. 
2) Illegality of the Marriage of an Apostate: 
Although the Administrative Court is not the judicial body which deals with personal 
status issues, the court ruled on the illegality of the marriage of an apostate in a case 
in 1984. This case is an example of the Administrative Court looking at a personal 
status issue because it is required in the process of reaching a ruling on the 
administrative issue, which is within the jurisdiction of the court.  
On the 27th of February, 1984, the court had to settle an appeal filled by Malak 
Al Sayed against the Judicial Committee for Agrarian Reform. The Committee 
refused to reconcile the familial situation of appellant based on Law 50 of 1969, 
which addresses the maximum allotted ownership of land for a family. The 
committee did not recognize the marriage of the plaintiff because she was previously 
a Muslim who then converted to Christianity and married a Christian. The court thus 
ruled in favor of the Judicial Committee. The court went on to state: that codified 
Egyptian law and Egyptian customs do not set rules which address the marriage of an 
apostate and therefore, in accordance with article one of the Civil Codes, the 
principles of Islamic Shari’a are applicable. The court stated that it in Islamic Shari’a 
“the apostasy of a person is not recognized and is of no legal significance.” Therefore, 
the court upheld the decision of the Judicial Committee and stated that the marriage 
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contract between the plaintiff and her husband is null and void. Consequently, the 
plaintiff did not meet the legal requirements for law 50 of 1969 as to reconcile the 
family situation.35 The court only looked at the legality of the marriage, a personal 
status issue, because it was a requirement for the administrative law, which is the 
actual issue the court ruled on. 
This case also showed how the status of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law is the 
base for the legal rules used in regards to apostasy. With the lack of a provision the 
court turned to Islamic Shari’a, just as the law stated. This proves that the role of 
Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law shapes the court’s ruling in regards to apostasy cases. 
Moreover, the court only dealt with the issue of apostasy because it included an 
external expression of apostasy, which is the plaintiff marrying a Christian. The court 
would not have looked at the case if the plaintiff changed her belief internally but did 
not act on it by marrying a non-Muslim, which is not allowed in Islamic Shari’a and 
hence in Egyptian law. 
3.  The Egyptian Penal Code: 
After understanding the legal framework of apostasy in both constitutional and 
administrative law, we now move to understand it within the Egyptian penal code. 
First of all, it must be understood that within mainstream Islamic jurisprudence a 
number of scholars equate blasphemy with apostasy. These scholars argue that 
committing blasphemy, through actions or statements, automatically leads to the 
apostasy of the person.36 The different opinions in Islamic Fiqh in regards to this 
issue will be discussed later on. Because some scholars see the act of blasphemy as 
apostasy, a full understanding of the legal framework of apostasy in Egypt requires 
understanding the legal framework of blasphemy. The provisions of the Egyptian 
Penal Code that can be related to apostasy are only the ones regarding the 
criminalization of blasphemy.  With the aim of understanding blasphemy this section 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Supreme	  Administrative	  Court,	  28	  Nov.1984,	  Appeal	  1359	  ,	  judicial	  year	  28.	  
36ABDALLAH	  SAEED	  AND	  HANSSAN	  SAEED,	  FREEDOM	  OF	  RELIGION,	  APOSTASY	  AND	  ISLAM	  38	  (Ashgate	  
Publishing	  Company)	  (2004).	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will answer a number of questions. How does Egyptian law treat the act of 
blasphemy? Is blasphemy in Egyptian penal code related to apostasy or is it an 
independent crime? What does the practice of the Egyptian criminal courts state in 
regarding to blasphemy?  This section will discuss the legal framework for blasphemy 
in Egyptian criminal law and jurisprudence, mainly the criminalization of blasphemy 
and treating it as an independent crime. The examination of Egyptian penal law and 
jurisprudence in regards to blasphemy will show how the role of Islamic Shari’a in 
Egyptian law is the base for the legal framework of apostasy in this field of law. 
Moreover, it will show how this field of law only deals with external apostasy and is 
not concerned with the internal beliefs of the citizens. 
a. Egyptian Penal Code and the Criminalization of Blasphemy: 
The Egyptian Penal Code deals with the issue of apostasy in regards to: making or 
publishing blasphemous statements or committing blasphemous actions. That 
definition in itself shows how blasphemy is an external expression. Although the 
Code does not mention the terms apostasy or blasphemy in any of its articles, three of 
its articles are used to penalize blasphemy. The Code through article 98 (f), 
especially, and articles 160 and 161, treats blasphemy as a misdemeanor. The main 
article used in by the courts and the police in regards to blasphemy is article 98 (f). 
The article states the following:  
Detention for a period of not less than six months and not exceeding five 
years, or paying a fine of not less than five hundred pounds and not exceeding 
one thousand pounds shall be the penalty inflicted on whoever exploits and 
uses the religion in advocating and propagating by talk or in writing, or by any 
other method, extremist thoughts with the aim of instigating sedition and 
division or disdaining and contempting any of the heavenly religions or the 
sects belonging thereto, or prejudicing national unity or social peace.37 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37The	  Penal	  Code,	  art.	  98	  (f),	  available	  at	  
https://www.google.com.eg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&sqi=2&ved=0C
CgQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Ftrack.unodc.org%2FLegalLibrary%2FLegalResources%2FEgypt%2FLaws
%2FEgypt%2520The%2520Penal%2520Code%2520Law%25201937.pdf&ei=y1tVUvC-­‐
G4XDtAbYkoH4DA&usg=AFQjCNHiRjzauUODRTHUkoDRc4nYY9iUXw&bvm=bv.53760139,d.Yms	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The Peoples’ Assembly passed law no.29 of 1982 as a result of the bloody 
sectarian clashes that took place in El Zawya Al Hamra in Cairo and that led to the 
death of tens of citizens. The law introduced article 98 (f) to the Penal Code and 
increased the penalty stated in article 160 of the same Code. Article 98 (f) was later 
amended in 2006. In the amendment the phrases “favoring” and “collective peace” 
were removed from the article due to their ambiguity. However, it is still argued that 
article 98 (f) does not meet the constitutional standards regarding a penal article. The 
article is argued to be ambiguous since it does not specifically state the acts that lead 
to the penalty and includes general phrases and therefore, can potentially be abused 
by the state.38 
 
In a study titled “Prohibited identities” issued by the Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights (EIPR); a quick analysis of the use of the blasphemy prohibition 
article takes place. The report states that  
 
The government has used Article 98(f) of the Penal Code to criminalize 
actions or other expressions of unorthodox religious views, including 
conversion from Islam….As the testimonies in this report indicate, officials 
have interpreted this article to proscribe conversion from Islam on the grounds 
that such conversion disparages Islam and is thus incompatible with public 
order.39 
 
Moreover, article 160 and article 161 of the same Code are also sometimes used to in 
regards to blasphemy. Article 160, which deals mainly with blasphemous actions, 
states the following: 
 
A penalty of detention and paying a fine of not less than one hundred pounds 
and not exceeding five hundred pounds or either penalty shall be inflicted on 
the following: 
First: Whoever perturbs the holding of rituals of a creed or a related religious 
ceremony, or obstructs it with violence or threat. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Adel	  Ramadan,	  Adam	  Dostoreyat	  “MadatTagreemTarweeg	  Al	  Afkar	  Al	  Motatarefa”,	  EIPR	  
(2012).	  
39Bahgat	  and	  Stork,	  supra	  note	  2.	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Second: Whoever ravages, breaks, destroys, or violates the sanctity of 
buildings provided for holding religious ceremonies, symbols or other objects 
having their profound reverence and sanctity in relation to the members of a 
creed or a group of people.40 
 
Article 161 states that: 
 
These penalties shall be imposed on any encroachment that takes place by one 
of the methods prescribed in Article 171, on a religion whose rituals are 
publicly held. 
The following shall fall under the provisions of this Article:  
First: Printing and publishing a book which is viewed as holy by members of a 
religion whose rituals are publicly held, if a text of this book is perverted in a 
way that changes its meaning. 
Second: Imitating a religious celebration in a public place or public 
community, with the aim of ridicule, or for the attendants to watch.41 
 
A blasphemy case cannot reach the court through an individual but only 
through the Public Prosecutor, since Article 1 of the Egyptian Criminal procedures 
law states that only the office of the Public Prosecutor can file criminal cases. Since 
Article 1 of the Egyptian Legal Procedures Law states that only the office of the 
Public Prosecutor can file criminal cases, which includes violations of articles 98 (f), 
160 and 161.42 Moreover, the Public Prosecution can decide not to send the case to 
the court. Therefore, whether or not a complaint regarding blasphemy will reach the 
courts is a matter in the hands of the Public Prosecution.43 
Lastly, on a constitutional level, the suspended constitution of 2012 included 
an article dealing specifically with blasphemy. Article 44 of that document stated that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40Supra	  note	  37,	  at	  article	  160.	  
41Id,	  at	  article	  161.	  
42	  The	  Criminal	  Procedures	  law,	  Art.	  1,	  available	  at	  
http://ar.jurispedia.org/index.php/%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%88%D8%B5_%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%86%D
9%88%D9%86_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%A1%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8
%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%A9_(eg)	  
43Ishaq	  Ibrahim,	  Hesar	  Al	  Tafkeer:	  QadayaIzd’ra’	  al-­‐AdyanKhelalAman	  Men	  Al	  Thawra,	  EIPR	  
(Aug	  2013).	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“Insult or abuse of all religious messengers and prophets shall be prohibited.”44 The 
new constitution does not include article 44. However, the previous inclusion of an 
article addressing blasphemy in the constitution indicates that the issue of blasphemy 
is important in Egyptian law. 
b. The  Practice of Criminal Courts: 
The Egyptian Criminal Courts, in all their different levels, have dealt with a sufficient 
number of blasphemy cases. The Court of Cassation, which is the highest court in 
Egypt which was created with the specific aim “to provide exclusive and uniform 
interpretation and application of law”45 issued a ruling regarding article 98 (f) of the 
penal code. While ruling on an appeal filed by a defendant, accused of blasphemy, 
against the merit of his respective case; the court of cassation provided an 
interpretation of the article. The court stated that article 98 (f) does have a material 
(ييددام) and a moral (ييونعم) aspect. In the material (ييددام) aspect, the article requires that 
the criminal “exploits and uses the religion in advocating and propagating by talk or 
in writing, or by any other method, extremist thoughts”.46 The moral (ييونعم) aspect 
requires that the criminal must be doing these actions with the intention of 
committing an illegal act which is “instigating sedition and division or disdaining and 
contempting any of the heavenly religions or the sects belonging thereto, or 
prejudicing national unity or social peace.”47 The court stated that every legal ruling 
must state, in detail, the evidence proving the satisfaction of the elements of the 
crime. In this specific case, it was alleged that the defendant, who is a barber, used a 
razor to cut the sign of the cross on the plaintiff and threatened to do the same sign 
with fire on the plaintiff’s face. The court ruled that although the actions of the barber 
are criminal they are not sufficient for the application of article 98 (f). The court of 
cassation stated that the lower court did not prove the elements of the crime as it did 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44Supra	  note	  13.	  
45	  Court	  of	  Cassation,	  available	  at	  
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=473	  
46	  Court	  of	  Cassation,	  Jan.	  7,	  1996,	  appeal	  41774	  judicial	  year	  54.	  
47	  Court	  of	  Cassation,	  Jan.	  7,	  1996,	  appeal	  41774	  judicial	  year	  54.	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not address the ways in which the defendant had the committed the moral element of 
the crime, meaning that the lower court failed to show how the actions of the 
defendant affected national unity or social peace.48 
The number of blasphemy cases increased after the 25th of January revolution. 
In 2011 a case was filed against a Shi’i citizen for desecration of a place of worship, 
which is a violation of article 160 of the Penal Code. The issue started when the 
people praying in the mosque did not approve of the defendant, Mohamed Fahmy 
Abdel Sayed Asfour, praying in the mosque because he is a Shi’i. The people did not 
approve because of some of the ritual difference in the act of praying, for example 
praying on the prayer beads. The issue then escalated inside the mosque leading to a 
fight and security forces closed it. A case was filed by the public prosecutor against 
the defendant after a complaint was filed by residents of the village. On the 24th of 
April, 2012, the Court of Kar El Zayat ruled that the defendant should serve 3 years 
with mandatory labor and set bail at 100 thousand Egyptian Pounds. The 
misdemeanor appeal court of Kafr el Zayat on the 26th of July 2012 accepted the 
appeal filed by the defendant in form but did not accept the merit. The court ruled that 
the defendant should serve a year in prison with labor and settle the expenses of the 
court. The court stated that when the defendant prayed, he engaged in acts that 
indicated that he was a Shi’i which led to discomfort of the rest of the individuals 
praying and thus led to the fights and subsequent desecration of the mosque.49 
The role of Islamic Shari’a, as a main source of legislation in Egyptian law, in 
defining the framework of blasphemy in Egyptian law is not as prevalent as it is in 
other fields of Egyptian law. This is because blasphemy has clear provisions 
regarding it illegality and its punishment, hence there is no need to go back to Islamic 
Shari’a to get the legal rules. Still the role Islamic Shari’a plays in setting the legal 
framework of blasphemy will be clearer in the coming section, where the link 
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  Court	  of	  Cassation,	  Jan.	  7,	  1996,	  appeal	  41774	  judicial	  year	  54.	  
49	  Case	  no	  1905	  year	  2012	  issued	  26	  July	  2012	  misdemeanor	  appeal	  court	  of	  Kafr	  el	  Zayatsee	  
Ibrahim,	  supra	  note	  43.	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between blasphemy and apostasy was done by Egyptian courts based on Islamic 
Shari’a. 
The other general theory of the legal framework of apostasy is definitely 
applicable in how Egyptian penal code deals with blasphemy. Blasphemy by its 
definition requires an external expression. Egyptian law and jurisprudence is not 
concerned if a person has internal blasphemous beliefs or thoughts, these are only of 
concern if these beliefs or thoughts are expressed externally.  
4.  The Egyptian Personal Status Law: 
After examining the legal framework of apostasy and its legal consequence in 
constitutional, administrative and criminal law, this section will address the Egyptian 
personal status law and case law in regards to apostasy and its legal consequences. 
For a full understanding of the legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian personal 
status law this section will start off with a quick look at the history of the Egyptian 
personal status law and its religious nature. This will explain why the role of Islamic 
Shari’a plays an even more essential role in setting the legal framework of apostasy in 
personal status law and jurisprudence. Afterwards, we will discuss a specific religious 
and legal concept used in personal status and apostasy cases. The concept called the 
Hisba law, regarding the obligation of a Muslim to forbid evil, and its origin and 
amendments will be discussed. Then, the practice of the Egyptian personal status 
courts in regards to apostasy will be address. This part will discuss the annulment of 
the marriage of an apostate and their incapacity to marry again, the status of the 
children of apostates, the incapacity of the apostate to inherit and the incapacity of an 
apostate to control his property. Therefore, this section will aim to answer a number 
of questions. How is the Egyptian personal status law of a religious nature? What is 
the Hisba law and how is it related to cases regarding personal status and apostasy? 
What are the different rulings issued by the personal status courts in regards to the 
legal consequences of apostasy? The examination of Egyptian Personal Status law 
and jurisprudence in regards to apostasy will show how the role of Islamic Shari’a in 
Egyptian law is the base for the legal framework of apostasy in this field of law. 
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Moreover, it will show how this field of law only deals with external apostasy and is 
not concerned with the internal beliefs of the citizens. 
a. The History of the Egyptian Personal Status Law: 
In matters of personal status law, religion has always played a role in Egypt. Since 
Egypt became part of the Ottoman Empire, there has been a system of multiple 
jurisdictions. Each religious group had its own courts with the jurisdiction of ruling 
on personal status issues. Courts dealing with Muslims, which were known as Shari’a 
Courts, had jurisdiction over non-Muslims only in two cases.50 By the Nineteenth 
Century, Egypt had 15 different religious sects using 9 different personal status laws. 
In 1955 the family courts were abolished and placed under the ordinary courts. The 
abolishment of the family courts did not unify the different laws and until this day 
there are 9 different personal status laws. The application of a law is based on the 
religion of the parties. The Court of Cassation stated that the parties to the conflict 
cannot choose which law to be applied, as a matter of public policy.51 Moreover, the 
role of religion in civil law is still strong. The prevalent opinion of the Hanafi School 
in of Islamic Fiqh is still applied in matters where codified law does not state a rule.52 
As stated earlier, in article 1 of the Civil Code states that “…In the absence of a 
provision of a law that is applicable, the Judge will decide according to custom and in  
the absence of custom in accordance with the principles of Moslem Law. In the 
absence of such principles, the Judge will apply the principles of natural justice and 
the rules of equity.” Therefore, the article ensures the application of the status of the 
Shari’a in Egyptian personal status laws.  
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  Firstly,	  the	  court	  had	  jurisdiction	  if	  one	  of	  the	  spouses	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  a	  Muslim,	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  Shari’a	  law	  must	  
be	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seeBerger	  ,	  supra	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  Moreover,	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This history explains why personal status law, more than any other law, is 
shaped and based on Islamic Shari’a. This will help in understanding the issue of 
apostasy rises in the field of personal status law more than any other field of Egyptian 
law, as will be elaborated on later. 
 
b. The Hisba Law: 
 
In traditional Islamic Fiqh, the concept of Hisba ishas two applications. First, it is 
related the duty of each and every Muslim “to promote good and forbid evil”. Second, 
it wasrelated to office of the Muhtasib, who was to represent the government in the 
market place and to ensure the abidance by public morals. This office was abolished 
in the first half of the 19th century.53 The first application of the concept of Hisba is 
the one that is of significance to current Egyptian law. The Islamic legal principle of 
Hisba basically gave citizens, which would be regularly considered to have no 
personal interest in the case, the right to file cases against others in the name of 
protecting “'the right of god' or the essential elements of the Islamic Faith”54. In 1996, 
the Egyptian Parliament amended article 3 of the Civil Code, which deals with Hisba. 
The amendment stated that citizens can only file claims regarding Hisba to the office 
of the Public Prosecutor and the office decides if it will file the case in the courts or 
not.55 Based on this amendment, it could be argued that the office of the Public 
Prosecution is the modern equivalent of the office of the Muhtasib.  
Understanding the Hisba law is essential to understand the cases that will be 
discussed in the coming part. It must be noticed that this law is yet another example 
of the role of Islamic Shair’a in the legal framework of apostasy. Not only is Islamic 
Shari’a the base for the ‘invisible law’ that is applied but it is also the base of the 
‘visible law’ which is codified.  
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c. Practice of the Personal Status Courts: 
 
 Egyptian Personal Status Courts have dealt with the concept of apostasy from many 
different angles. The courts ruled on cases regarding the capacity of the courts in 
declaring a person an apostate, the marriage of apostates, the status of their children, 
the right to inheritance of the apostate and the status of the property of an apostate. 
The practice of the courts will be discussed in the coming part. In discussing the 
jurisprudence the role of Islamic Shari’a as the base for the legal framework of 
apostasy in Egyptian penal code will be become much clearer. Moreover, it will be 
also clear that the stance of Egyptian personal status courts in regards to internal 
apostasy is consistent with that of the other courts, which is that apostasy is only a 
legal issue when it takes an external form.  
 
1) Court of Cassation and Declaring a Muslim an Apostate: 
 
Before dealing with the different cases within personal status laws it is important to 
understand the stance of the Court of Cassation in regards to declaring a Muslim an 
Apostate or takfir. In the article “Submitting Faith to Judicial Scrutiny Through the 
Family Trail: The “Abu Zayd Case” Kilian Balz states that there is a specific opinion 
regarding how a court can establish that a person committed apostasy. Balz states: 
 
In the past, the Court of Cassation, in particular, followed a rough and 
pragmatic approach. According to this approach, apostasy can only be 
established in two cases: (i.) if someone pronounces an acknowledgement 
[iqrar] declaring to have turned away from Islam, or (ii.) if a document is 
presented according to which he has opted for another religion. In other 
words, someone who considers himself a Muslim is also legally considered a 
Muslim. The question whether someone is truly a Muslim is beyond judicial 
scrutiny: A court has no right to declare someone an infidel but is bound to the 
submissions of the parties.56 
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However it is still stated that the court does not follow these guidelines in all 
cases. The court does commit judicial scrutiny by taking the accounts of witnesses or 
the writings of a person as a base for declaring a Muslim an apostate. An example of 
these cases will be discussed in the coming parts. 
 
The quoted section also shows that Egyptian courts are not concerned with the 
internal beliefs of the person. It is only concerned if the apostasy takes an external 
form, which is by pronunciation or the existence of a document that proves it.  
According to the ruling, if a person does not do anything that shows his apostasy then 
it is not a legal issue for the court.  
 
2) Marriage: 
The principle regarding the marriage of an apostate, among many other principles 
regarding the status of an apostate, was dealt with in the most prominent apostasy 
case in Egyptian law, the Nasr Hamed Abou Zayd case. This case will be discussed 
first because of its importance to understanding the relationship between apostasy and 
blasphemy and apostasy and marriage in Egyptian law. As Berger summarizes the 
case: 
 
 In 1996, the Egyptian Court of Cassation ruled that the writings of the 
Egyptian Muslim scholar, Nasr Abu Zayd, on Islam constituted an act of 
apostasy, the abandonment of one’s religion. Being declared an apostate by 
the court resulted in the ugly repercussion that Abu Zayd’s marriage was 
declared void.57 
 
The case is of tremendous importance to Egyptian law as it reached the 
highest court, the Court of Cassation. The court applied many of the principles 
regarding apostasy showing how Islamic Shari’a plays a main role in shaping the 
legal framework of apostasy in Egyptian law. First, the court stated that the applied 
law in regards to issues of personal status is Islamic Shari’a, and more specifically the 
prominent opinion of scholars of the Hanafi Islamic school. The court also stated that 
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the lack of a codified law regarding an issue does not mean that the legislator 
intended to contradict Islamic law. In its application of Islamic Shari’a, the court 
stated principles regarding apostasy in Islam. The court defined apostasy as “a clear 
declaration of unbelief (kufr)”58, the court also stated that this clear declaration of 
kufr takes place through “a proclamation of apostasy or by denying the Quran or the 
Sunnah, or mocks it or denies it or opposes what was stated in them, knowing the 
truth, worshiping other than Allah or another with him or denies the prophet or his 
prophecy or stopped doing what is required from a Muslim making him an unbeliever 
or did what is prohibited as if it is allowed.”59 
 
Moreover, the court stated that: 
 
Merely believing the mentioned [unbelief] is not considered apostasy, unless 
it is embodied in words or actions. According to the majority of the Muslim 
legal scholars, among them the Hanafis, it suffices to consider a person an 
apostate once he deliberately speaks or acts in unbelief, as long as he meant to 
be degrading, contemptuous, obstinate, or mocking.60 
 
The court stated that after committing an act or making statements of unbelief, 
a person is considered an apostate even if the person states that they are a Muslim.61 
Berger states that the court overlaps the concepts of heresy, blasphemy, apostasy and 
unbelief. He argues that the court has a different definition for each concept but that it 
agrees that they all lead to apostasy.62 The court ruled that the writings of Nasr 
Hamed Abou Zayd went beyond the allowed interpretations of the Qur’an, as it 
looked into issues that are based on definitive texts and what is necessarily known in 
the religion. The court therefore ruled that Abou Zayd is an apostate and his marriage 
to his Muslim wife must be annulled, since a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-
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Muslim.63 This case is of great importance because it does not deal with a Muslim 
that declared his conversion from Islam. The case deals with a Muslim that expressed 
his opinion and consequently was declared an apostate despite that, up to the moment 
of his death, Abou Zayd maintained that he is a Muslim. The case is an example of 
Egyptian courts dealing with blasphemy as apostasy.  
 
One of the most interesting and discussed aspects of the Abou Zayd ruling is 
the court’s distinction between freedom of belief and worship. The court states that 
every person has full freedom of belief without any limitation and that any person can 
convert their religion except Muslims. The court states that when a person agrees to 
become a Muslim they agree to not having the right to convert from Islam. The court 
states that conversion from Islam is part of freedom of worship and not freedom of 
belief; therefore, conversion can be limited due to the protection of public order and 
morals. The court states that Islamic Shari’a is part of public order, and since it does 
not allow or recognize apostasy; apostasy can be prohibited from the protection of 
public order.64 The case of Abu Zayd also is an important example of the court 
committing takfir, which is declaring a Muslim an unbeliever.65 This case also shows 
how the Egyptian legal framework of blasphemy as apostasy is based on the legal 
requirement to apply Islamic Shari’a. 
 
Other cases regarding apostasy and marriage took place in Egyptian Courts. 
For example, the court of appeals ruled for the annulment of a marriage between a 
Muslim woman and her husband who reconverted to Islam. Despite the husband 
having never attended the court to declare his conversion, a witness stated that the 
husband baptized his daughter in a church and the court deemed this as sufficient 
evidence of his apostasy and annulled the marriage.66 This case is another example of 
the courts committing takfir.  
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Another case took place in 1966 when the court also accepted a Hisba case 
calling for the annulment of the marriage between a convert woman and her Christian 
husband. The case was filed by the landlord of the apartment that the couple lived in. 
The landlord argued that the marriage contract of the couple is null since the woman 
is an apostate; and that they should be evicted from the apartment. The court of 
cassation accepted the case based on the concept of Hisba and ruled that the marriage 
is in fact null.67 
 
Lastly, in 1995 the court of Cassation ruled that in application of Islamic 
Shari’a; an apostate does not have the right to get married. The court stated that an 
apostate is equal to a dead person, meaning that the apostate does not have the right to 
marry a Muslim or a non-Muslim. Moreover, the court stated that if an apostate does 
in fact marry then, their children are not considered legal and do not have the right to 
inherit from him/her.68 Therefore, this case is of great importance as it deals with the 
capacity of an apostate to marry and not just with the status of the current marriage of 
the apostate.  
 
In all of the stated cases the legal requirement to apply Islamic Shari’a creates the 
base and legal rules for the rulings of the courts. Moreover, all of the cases include 
what the court considers an external expression of apostasy. The Nasr Hamed Abu 
Zayd includes an external expression through his writings. In the first marriage 
annulment case, the baptism of the husband’s kid was considered a public expression 
of apostasy. In the second marriage annulment case, the marriage of the woman to a 
non-Muslim man was considered the public expression of apostasy. All of these cases 
prove once again that Egyptian courts are not concerned with the internal belief of the 
person but only the public expression of apostasy.  
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3) Status of Children of Apostates:  
 
On the 28th of December, 1998, the Court of Cassation issued a ruling regarding the 
status of the children of apostates. The court stated that the religion of the child of an 
apostate depends on when the child was born. If the child was born before the father 
became an apostate, then the child remains a Muslim and does not follow the 
apostasy of the parent. If the child is born after the apostasy of the father, then the 
child has the right to choose their religion when they become an adult, either by 
showing the signs of puberty or reaching the age of fifteen years Hijri.69 The court’s 
ruling was based on what it considered the agreed upon rules of Islamic Shari’a, 
which must be applied because of the legal status of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law. 
 
4) Inheritance:  
 
On 19th of January 1966 the court of cassation ruled that an apostate does not inherit 
from a Muslim or a non-Muslim or an apostate.70 Moreover, on the15th of January, 
1991, the Court of Cassation ruled that the apostasy of a person is a barrier against 
others inheriting from him. The court stated that if a person dies an apostate then no 
one has the right to inherit from him or her.71This again is an application of what the 
court saw as the agreed upon rules of Islamic Shari’a, which must be applied because 
of the legal status of Islamic Shari’a in Egyptian law. 
 
5) Property: 
 
On the 27th of November, 1990, the Court of Cassation issued a ruling regarding the 
property of an apostate. Within an inheritance case, the court stated that the property 
of an apostate returns to him/her after he/she returns to Islam. The court stated that 
the ownership of the apostate to his inheritance is suspended. Moreover, the court 
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stated that an apostate should be asked to repent. The court did not give more 
information in regards to repentance of an apostate.72This ruling is also based on the 
court applying what it considered the established rules of Islamic Shari’a that must be 
applied in accordance with the status of Shari’a in Egyptian law. 
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III. International Law and Apostasy: 
 
After addressing the legal framework for apostasy in Egyptian law and jurisprudence, 
it is essential to address the stance of international law in regards to the issue. This 
chapter will only discuss international law and apostasy to the depth sufficient for this 
thesis. The chapter will mainly discuss the international Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),73which Egypt is a party to, and its stance in regards to 
apostasy through religious conversion. This chapter will answer the following 
questions. What is the stance of the ICCPR in regards to apostasy? What is the stance 
of the ICCPR in regards to limiting freedom of belief based on rules of a specific 
religious tradition? And what is the stance of Egypt in regards to the ICCPR? 
 
A. ICCPR and Apostasy: 
Article 18 of the ICCPR insures freedom of religion and belief. The article states the 
following:  
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or 
belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious 
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and moral education of their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.74 
The article basically states that freedom of thought, conscious and religion 
cannot be limited by the state in any manner. On the other hand, freedom to express 
religion and belief through worship or rituals can be limited based on the protection 
of public safety, order, health or morals or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. It is required that these limitations be prescribed by law. 
Although the article does not mention directly the right to apostasy through 
conversion from religion, many states believe that this right is guaranteed in the 
article. When the drafting the article many state parties saw that the statement 
insuring the freedom “to adopt a religion or belief” is broad enough to insure freedom 
to convert.75 
Scholarly analysis of the article is abundant. Still, only a number of statements 
and analyses are mainly of interest when it comes to the right to religion conversion 
and the possibility of legally limiting it.  
The ICCPR established a Human Rights Committee to review the reports sent 
by the state parties every four years in regards to their compliance with the 
Convention and to issue its interpretations of the provisions of the Convention. The 
Committee is made up of prominent international law experts that belong to countries 
that are part to the Convention.76 In the Committee’s General Comment on article 18 
of the ICCPR it is stated that freedom of religion and belief naturally entails the 
freedom to convert one's religion.77 The General Comment states: 
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Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief 
from the freedom to manifest religion or belief. It does not permit any 
limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the 
freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one's choice.78 
Moreover the general comment ensures that freedom of religion and belief 
cannot be limited based on morals. In the general comment it is stated that: 
The Committee observes that the concept of morals derives from many social, 
philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations on the 
freedom to manifest a religion or belief for the purpose of protecting morals 
must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single tradition.79 
This comment implies that limitations on freedom of belief cannot be based on a 
religious tradition only. Therefore, this comment shows that the Human Rights 
Committee believes that adherence to religious traditions cannot be the base for 
limiting freedom of belief, including the freedom to convert. 
In addition, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion and 
Belief also asserts the same point by stating that 
[t]he right to freedom of religion or belief protects primarily the individual 
and, to some extent, the collective rights of the community concerned but it 
does not protect religions or beliefs per se.80 
These two statements are of importance as they provide the perspective of 
international law in regards to freedom of religion and belief, which essentially 
includes concludes that the right to conversion, cannot be limited based on morals or 
tradition. If these statements are accepted; it would be right to assume that limiting 
the right to convert from Islam or preventing it as well as enforcing punishments on 
it, will not be in accordance with international law as interpreted by its most 
prominent scholars and experts. 
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B.  Egyptian Reservation on the ICCPR: 
As stated earlier, Egypt is a party to the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). After ratifying the Convention in 1982 Egypt added the 
statement: “Taking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Shari‘a and the 
fact that they do not conflict with the text [i.e. the Covenant] . . . we accept, support 
and ratify it.”81 This statement is seen by some as a reservation on the Convention, in 
which Egypt states that it will not apply any aspect of the Convention that is not in 
accordance with Islamic Shari’a. Others see that this statement is an acknowledgment 
by the Egyptian State that the Convention does not contradict Islamic Shari’a, 
especially because Egyptian government officials stated that there is no contradiction 
between Islamic Shari’a and the Convention when asked by the Human Rights 
Committee established by the ICCPR.82 The first interpretation sees that only the 
aspects in the convention that are in accordance to Islamic Shari’a will be applied. 
The second interpretation sees that Egypt only ratified this convention as it does not 
contradict Islamic Shari’a. Both interpretations show that Islamic Shari’a does play a 
role in the interpretation of the international obligations of the Egyptian State.  Both 
interpretations also show that Islamic Shari’a is a higher source of law in Egypt than 
international obligations and that its application is the highest legal obligation. This 
shows that in the case of apostasy and the application of its legal consequences 
Egyptian courts will only follow their obligation to insure freedom of belief and 
practice as long as it does not contradict Islamic Shari’a. 
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IV. State Premises the Legal Consequences of Apostasy on Confessional Law: 
The justification for not allowing apostasy was briefly mentioned in the first chapter 
regarding the practice of the Egyptian judiciary. By examining the judicial rulings 
and law of the Egyptian state it can be concluded that freedom of belief is limited 
based on the legal requirement to apply confessional law, Islamic Shari’a. This 
conclusion is supported by both the actions of the state authorities and its judiciary. 
First of all there are no available official statements by state authorities in regards to 
basing the legal consequences of apostasy on the application of Islamic Shari’a. Still, 
government officials have constantly refused to recognize a citizen’s apostasy 
through conversion from Islam. Those government officials argue the conversion 
cannot be recognized because apostasy is not allowed in Islam. This refusal is based 
on their interpretation of Islamic Shari’a and not based on any legal article.83Second 
of all, Egyptian courts also base their limitation on freedom of belief on the 
application of Islamic Shari’a. Courts’ rulings regarding apostasy mention that 
Shari’a is the reason behind the application of the legal consequences of apostasy and 
its non-recognition. The rulings of the courts mentioned in the first chapter show that 
in most cases the court only states that apostasy is not allowed in Egyptian law 
because it is not allowed in Islamic Shari’a, which is the main source of Egyptian 
legislation. Moreover, the courts also apply the legal consequences of apostasy 
because it is an application of Islamic Shari’a.In most cases the courts do not 
elaborate on the legal reasoning. Only in few cases, mainly the Nasr Hamed Abou 
Zayd case, the court elaborates more on its obligation to apply Islamic Shari’a. The 
courts simply argue that undisputed rules of Islamic Shari’a, which according to the 
courts include the rules regarding the non-recognition of apostasy and the application 
of its legal consequences, are a part of Egyptian public policy and therefore must be 
applied. This legal justification put forward by the state will be discussed in the 
following part.  
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To address the legal justification used by Egyptian courts in regards to the 
non-recognition of apostasy and the application of its legal consequences and its 
relationship to the application of Islamic Shari’a, this chapter will answer a main 
question. How does the state use the concept of public policy as a legal justification 
for the application of the undisputed rules of Islamic Shari’a, including the rules 
regarding apostasy?  
 
A. Public Policy as a Legal Justification for the Non-Recognition of Apostasy 
and the Application of its Legal Consequences: 
 
This section will discuss the use of the concept of public policy by Egyptian 
judiciary as the justification for the non-recognition of apostasy and the application of 
its legal consequences. To understand this legal logic the relationship between public 
policy and Islamic Shari’a will be addressed. This section will address this point 
through answering a number of questions. What is the definition of the legal concept 
of public policy? What role of the concept of public policy play in Egyptian 
jurisprudence? What is the definition of public policy as given by Egyptian court and 
how do the courts definite the undisputed rules of Islamic Shari’a as part of public 
policy? And finally, how is Islamic Shari’a as public policy used as the legal base for 
the non-recognition of apostasy and the application of its legal consequences? 
 
1. Public Policy:  
The concept of public policy is mainly used in regards to conflict laws. The concept is 
applied in regards to the application of foreign laws in national courts.84Public policy 
can be defined as “those legal principles that are considered fundamental to a society, 
and which may not be contradicted, altered, or violated by any rules or laws of that 
same society.”85Public policy insures that the foreign laws that contradict the 
fundamental values of the nation cannot be applied. This concept is mainly applied in 
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regards to family law since it is the legal field in which foreign laws could play a 
role.86For example, a foreigner would have the right to apply his foreign laws in 
regards to marriage and divorce but these laws will not be applied if they contradict 
the fundamental values, the public policy, of the national state. The concept of public 
policy can also play a role when there is a conflict between national laws. This 
requires the existence of multiple national laws and a superiority of one, as exists in 
the Egyptian law in regards to interreligious personal status laws and the superiority 
of Islamic Shari’a.87 
 
a.  Egyptian Public Policy: 
The concept of public policy was introduced into the Egyptian legal system by the 
European system, especially France, in the late 1800s. The Egyptian court of 
Cassation has defined public policy in more than one case as “‘the social, political, 
economical or moral principles in a state related to the highest (or essential) interest 
(maslaha ‘ulya, or: masalihjawhariyya) of society,’ or as ‘the essence (kiyan) of the 
nation.’”88 The legislator does not define what exactly constitutes public policy but 
leaves the definition to the judiciary. This shows that what constitutes public policy, 
as a representation of the fundamental values of the nation, can be changed and 
altered depending on the times. 
 
1) Islamic Shari’a as Public Policy: 
 
The analysis of the practice of the Egyptian courts in regards to the apostasy and its 
legal consequences shows the use of Islamic Shari’a as public policy as a 
justification. Egypt's highest courts constantly ruled that Islamic Shari’a is in fact a 
defining aspect of the public policy of the state, since Egypt is an Islamic state and 
the majority of its citizens are Muslim. The Egyptian courts, including the Supreme 
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Constitutional Court, defined Islamic Shari’a as the “‘essential principles of Islamic 
law’ as the principles that are considered fixed and indisputable (nasssarihqati’ al-
thubutwaqati’ al-dalala).”89To discuss the role is Islamic Shari’a as part of Egyptian 
public policy we will mainly rely on the research conducted by the scholar Maurits 
Berger in his articles “Apostasy and Public Policy in Contemporary Egypt: An 
Evaluation of Recent Cases from Egypt’s Highest Courts” and “Conflicts Law and 
Public Policy in Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law through the Back Door.” The 
stated articles are used as a main base for information in this section as they represent 
a full analysis of Egypt jurisprudence in regards to Islamic Shari’a as part of Egyptian 
public policy and in regards to the relationship between apostasy and public policy. 
For example, in the analysis of different Egyptian courts’ rulings  and scholarly 
articles regarding Islamic Shari’a as public policy, which takes place in “Conflicts 
Law and Public Policy in Egyptian Family Law: Islamic Law through the Back 
Door”, a list of the principles considered part of Islamic public policy was compiled. 
The list includes the following principles (Berger specifics that the principles put 
between brackets are the ones that were only mentioned by one or two scholars or 
rulings or are disputed by some): 
- The prohibition of a marriage between a Muslim woman with a non-Muslim 
man (and its mirror image rule: allowing for a marriage between a Muslim 
man and a non-Muslim woman); 
- The husband's right of polygamy; 
- Marriage conditions: a) mutual consent (taradi) between bride 
and groom and b) the presence of two male Muslim witnesses (ishhad); 
- The relatives with whom marriage is not allowed (maharim); 
- [Prohibition of re-marriage without observing the waiting period 
('idda) after divorce or decease of the husband] 
- [The bridal gift (mahr)] 
- [The prohibition of adoption] 
- The interdiction to acknowledge illegitimate children; 
- Unilateral divorce (talaq) by the husband; 
- Certain rules of Islamic intestate law, the most important being: 
a) the share of the woman is half of her brother's, b) the order of precedence of 
the relatives assigned as heirs by the Quran, c) the size of each of the shares 
allotted by the Quran; 
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- Intestate succession between a Muslim and non-Muslim; 
- Bequest of the testator amounting to more than one third of his property; 
- Conversion to Islam renders Islamic law immediately applicable; 
- Conversion to Islam becomes effective as of the pronouncement of the 
shahada; 
- [The prohibition of apostasy from Islam.]90 
 
These principles are a representation of what Egyptian courts and scholarly analysis 
considered part of public policy because they are undisputed Islamic law principles. 
Moreover, it is noticed that most of the mentioned rules were stated in the Holy 
Qur’an; therefore, the authenticity of their source is undisputed.91Still some of the 
stated principles are not based on Qur’anic texts but are based on the work and 
interpretations of Islamic Scholars.  
a)   Apostasy Rules as Islamic Public Policy:  
 
As stated in the list the prohibition of apostasy is considered one of the rules 
constituting Islamic Shari’a as public policy. Both the Court of Cassation and the 
State Council ruled in multiple cases that the rules regarding apostasy are part of 
these undisputed principles of Islamic Shari’a.92 Therefore, the courts see that the 
application of the legal consequences of apostasy and the non-recognition of the 
apostasy through conversion from Islam are based on essential principles of Islamic 
Shari’a, making their non-application a violation of public policy. In other words, the 
courts structure the limitation on freedom of belief, in the form of limitations on 
apostasy through conversion and the application of the legal consequences of 
apostasy, as the fulfillment of existing and necessary public policy. This rationale in 
itself is detrimental to religious conversion as it elevates religious conversion from a 
religious issue to a national issue. A religious convert, aiming to convert out of 
personal conviction can thus be argued to be damaging towards society. This legal 
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logic takes the matter of apostasy, which is matter of personal belief, and makes it an 
issue of public policy. This leads to the legal requirement to limit this personal belief 
and not recognize the apostasy or/and apply its legal consequences as not doing so 
would be considered a violation of Islamic Shari’a as public policy. 
 
Having Islamic Shari’a, including the rules regarding apostasy, as part of 
public policy is used by Egypt as an explanation to why limiting of freedom of belief 
and practice, is not a violation of its international obligations. This argument is made 
despite the fact that Egypt stated that nothing in the ICCPR conflicts with Shari'a law. 
Egyptian courts rule, in accordance with the ICCPR, that freedom of belief is absolute 
and cannot be limited in any way or for any reason. On the other hand, the freedom of 
practice of that said belief can be limited by public order, policy, morals and values. 
The Supreme Constitutional Court stated the following: 
The first of these two [i.e. the freedom of belief] is unrestricted, while the 
second [i.e. the practice of this belief] may be restricted by means of its 
[internal] order to affirm some of its highest interests, and in particular on the 
grounds of preserving public policy and moral values [al-nizam al-‘ammwa 
al- ‘adab] and to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.93 
 
That same distinction was applied by the Court of Cassation and 
Administrative Court in regards to apostasy. For example in 1980 the Administrative 
Court ruled that: 
 
Since Islam protects the freedom of belief—for Islam may not be forced on 
anyone—freedom of belief as granted by the Constitution means that each 
individual may freely embrace whichever religion he believes without 
constraint. However, this freedom does not restrict the application of the 
Islamic Shari‘a to those who embrace Islam. The State’s religion is Islam. . . . 
Since the plaintiff has embraced Islam, he must then submit to its law which 
does not condone apostasy.94 
 
And the court of Cassation, in the Nasr Abu Zayd Case, ruled that: 
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The purpose of entering Islam is to abide by its rules, including those of 
apostasy. . . . The rules for apostasy are no more than measures to keep a 
Muslim in his Islam, distinguishing him from others. . . . This is what also 
happens in other religious laws with regard to their followers: they demand 
continuous loyalty to them. Once an individual joins in, he is to abide by its 
rules which can expel or segregate him if he violates their fundamental 
principles which he embraced. . . . Certain religious laws . . . consider a 
difference of religion an impediment to marriage which prevents its 
conclusion, and they consequently impose separation or divorce. The same 
applies when one of the spouses embraces another religion. This does not 
violate the freedom of belief.95 
 
Basically, Egyptian Courts rule that apostasy is not a matter of belief but 
rather a matter of practice of belief. Therefore, in accordance with the ICCPR and the 
Supreme Constitutional Court, practice of belief can be limited by public policy and 
order, which includes the undisputed Shari’a rules regarding apostasy and its legal 
consequences. The concept of Islamic Shari’a as public policy is used to insure the 
application of essential Islamic Shari’a rules that are not found in statutory 
laws.96This understanding and interpretation of the law gives the Egyptian state the 
capacity to base the application of the legal consequences of apostasy and its refusal 
to recognize apostasy on Islamic Shari’a as public policy. 
 
It must be noticed that the recognition of apostasy as part of freedom of 
practice and not freedom of belief is in contrary to popular scholarly opinion and 
interpretation of article 18 of the ICCPR, as mentioned in section 2.1. of this thesis. 
The courts chose to label apostasy as an act of freedom to practice belief and not an 
act of freedom of belief without giving a convincing argument to why they contradict 
what the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR stated in its interpretation of the 
article, which is that freedom to convert from one religion is a matter of freedom of 
belief and that the interpretation of the article cannot be based on a specific tradition, 
which would include Islamic Shari’a. 
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V. Challenging the Justification of the State: the True Stance of Shari’a in 
Regards to Apostasy: 
As stated in the previous section, the state uses Islamic law as a base for the non-
recognition of apostasy and the application of its legal consequences. The state, which 
includes the courts, argues that the rules regarding apostasy and its legal 
consequences are part of the indisputable rules of Islamic Shari’a. Therefore, they are 
considered part of the principles of Islamic Shari’a that must be applied as part of the 
state’s public policy. In this chapter, this argument will be challenged. This chapter 
will aim to prove that the rules regarding apostasy and its legal consequences are in 
fact disputable as they are not a matter of consensus between Islamic jurists. 
Consequently, the non-application of the legal consequences of apostasy and its 
recognition are not violations of Egyptian public policy as Islamic Shari’a.  
This chapter will discuss all previously mentioned Islamic Shari’a concepts 
and how the rules regarding them are in fact disputable. To address this issue and 
challenge the justification given by the state, this chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first section of this chapter will discuss the general approach of Islam to 
freedom of belief. What is the stance of Islam in regards to tolerance to others 
religions? What is the stance of Islam in regards to religious tolerance between 
Muslims? What is the stance of Islam in regards to religious coercion? All these 
questions will be answered in the first section of this chapter. 
The second section of this chapter will discuss the stance of Islamic Shari’a in 
regards to the act of apostasy, its prohibition and its punishment. The first part of the 
second section will discuss the stance of the Holy Qur’an in regards to apostasy. Does 
the Qur’an state a temporal punishment for the act of apostasy? Does the Qur’an call 
for the non-recognition of apostasy? Afterwards, the second part of the second section 
will move to a detailed analysis of how the rules of Islamic jurisprudence in regards 
to apostasy are in fact disputable and not a matter of consensus. Since according to 
Egyptian courts apostasy can be committed through the abandonment of Islam, or 
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conversion from it, and the committing the act of blasphemy, we will have to look at 
the disputed nature of the rules regarding both kinds of apostasy separately. The first 
fraction of this part will address the rules of Islamic Shari’a pertaining to apostasy 
through the abandonment of Islam or the conversion of another religion. The second 
fraction will address the rules of Islamic Shari’a in regards to apostasy through 
committing blasphemy. In the first fraction we will examine the relationship between 
the first type of apostasy, which is through the abandonment of Islam or the 
conversion to another religion, and the concept of treason. Basically, the argument is 
that due to the close relationship between religion and politics in the early Islamic 
nation, Islamic jurists confused the punishment for treason and applied it as the 
punishment for committing apostasy by abandoning Islam.  In the second fraction we 
will move to examine the disputed nature of the rules regarding the second type of 
apostasy, which is through committing blasphemy. To do so we will look at the 
stance of the Holy Qur’an and difference of opinions of Islamic Jurists in regards to 
committing apostasy through committing blasphemy. Basically, the argument is that 
considering blasphemy an automatic apostasy in not an undisputed rule of Islamic 
Shari’a.  
In the third section of the chapter, we will move to discuss how the rules 
regarding the legal consequences of apostasy on personal status are in fact disputed 
within Islamic Shari’a. In this section we will specifically look at the diversity of 
scholarly opinion pertaining to the relationship between apostasy and personal status, 
including marriage, inheritance and property. 
By proving that all of the rules regarding the non-recognition of apostasy and 
the application of its legal consequences are in fact disputed within Islamic Shari’a, 
we will prove that their application is not a legal requirement, as they are not part of 
the undisputed rules of Islamic public policy.  
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A. The Context in which Apostasy Rules Exist: General Approach of Islam to 
Freedom of Belief: 
To understand the stance of Islamic Shari’a in regards to apostasy and its legal 
consequences, one must understand the general approach of Islamic Shari’a towards 
freedom of belief. In this section we will look at two different concepts and their 
relationship to Islam. Firstly, the strong relationship between Islam and religious 
tolerance will be examined. This includes tolerance towards other religions and 
towards other Muslims, represented in the concept of the prohibition of Takfir Al 
Muslim (declaring a Muslim an apostate) in Islamic Shari’a. Secondly, the stance of 
Islamic Shari’a against religious coercion must be analyzed. Understanding thesetwo 
concepts and their importance in Islamic Shari’a shows that the general context in 
which the rules of apostasy and its legal consequences exists is in fact very supportive 
of freedom of belief.  
1.  Islam and Tolerance 
 
The relationship between Islam and religious tolerance is of a strong nature. Islam 
insures tolerance towards both followers of other religions and towards other 
Muslims. The part will discuss both kinds of tolerance. 
 
a. Islam and Tolerance Towards Other Religions: 
Islam as presented in the Holy Scripture the Qur’an acknowledged, from the very 
beginning, the diversity of religions. The Qur’an gave a special position to Judaism 
and Christianity as religions based on revealed Scriptures as well, which are The 
Torah and The Gospel respectively. The Qur’an mentioned both religions and stated 
that it is a continuation of them. On the other hand, the Qur’an rejected aspects of 
both religions arguing that they were not in accordance with the original teachings of 
the prophets.97 Other beliefs were not recognized in the Qur’an, for example idolatry 
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that was widespread in the region. Even though that belief system was not recognized 
like the revealed religions, the Qur’an called on Muslims to respect all people and to 
interact with them regardless of their religion as long as the respect was 
reciprocated.98 “The Muslims were commanded not to abuse or slander the deities of 
the any religion including the idolaters.”99 When Muslims had more political control 
it was stated that non-Muslims that do not act in hostility will not face any threat and 
their religious traditions will be respected. The religious tolerance toward peaceful 
non-Muslims continued after the death of the Prophet. For example, when Caliphates 
conquered new regions they did not inhibit the rights of the inhabitants to keep their 
religion, which included unrevealed religions such as Zoroastrianism, so long as they 
acknowledged the political supremacy of the Muslims.100 Moreover, the principle of 
religious tolerance was maintained throughout the history between Muslims and non-
Muslims, except for “relatively few”101 exceptions.102 Modern scholars have argued 
that Islam has always recognized the freedom of religion, whether it meant believing 
in a revealed religion, an unrevealed one, or even atheism.103 
b. Islam and Tolerance Towards Other Muslims: 
In Islam religious tolerance is not only given to followers of other religions but it is 
also a must between Muslims. This type of tolerance is mainly represented in the 
concept of Takfir al Muslim, which is declaring a Muslim an unbeliever. The act of 
Takfir al Muslim by another individual is prohibited in Islam.104 The Qur’an 
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commands that tolerance must be given to all believers and that a Muslim, in 
accordance with 4:94 of the Holy Qur’an, should not treat others with “predisposed 
assumptions”.105 Moreover, there are a number of Hadiths that limit the action of 
Takfir al Muslim. One Hadith states “Whoever prays our prayer, facing the qiblah 
that we face and eats what we have slaughtered, is a Muslim. He shall have the same 
rights and obligations as we have.”106 This Hadith ensures that it should be enough 
for a person to recognize the other as a Muslim if they pray facing Mecca. Another 
Hadith states, “When a man calls his brother a 'kafir', one of them is afflicted with the 
charge. Either it is as he says or (if the accusation is not true), it befalls the person 
who uttered.”107 This Hadith aims to deter Muslims of accusing others of disbelief.  
 
Baring in mind the prohibition against takfir al Muslim by an individual, early 
Islamic scholars discussed the methods by which ascertaining apostasy in court can 
take place. It can take place through confession of apostasy or the testimony of two 
witnesses.108Widely respected Islamic Scholar Mawduwdi states that “This matter is 
directly to do with God, and it is He Who shall decide it on the Day of Judgment.”109 
This statement ensures that in Islamic law, no person has the right to judge whether or 
not a person is a believer and that this is a matter between a person and God, thus 
God is the only person with the capacity to judge the conscious of a person. This 
statement is in accordance with what Egyptian Courts state their position to be. 
Therefore and as stated in the First Chapter, Egyptian Courts claim that unbelief or 
apostasy is only known when a person declares it, commits an act or says a statement 
that proves his apostasy. Still, as stated earlier the courts in all cases do not follow 
this position. The clearest example is the Nasr Hamed Abu Zayd case. As stated 
earlier, during the Abu Zayd case the court did not see his proclamation of Islam as 
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useful without taking back the statements he wrote in his books. The court saw his 
statements as sufficient evidence of his apostasy even if he states al Shehada. 
 
2. Islam and the Prohibition Against Coercion 
As stated earlier, the context in which the rules pertaining to apostasy and its legal 
consequences exist is one that calls for freedom of belief and embraces it. Beside the 
stance of Islam in regards to tolerance towards others, Islam also supports freedom of 
belief by prohibiting religious coercion. In 2:256 of the Holy Qur’an a 
straightforward statement insuring freedom of religion is provided. The verse states 
“there is no compulsion in religion.” according to Donna E. Arztthe author of the 
article “The Role of Compulsion in Islamic Conversion: Jihad, Dhimma and Ridda” : 
This freedom has been said to encompass not only the freedom to hold theistic 
beliefs as well as the freedom to hold non-theistic beliefs, but also the freedom 
to change one's religion or belief or to refuse to change one's religion or belief, 
all without coercion or discrimination.'110 
 
The Qur’an forbids religious coercion in other verses as well. For example, in 
18:29 it is stated that “The truth [has now come] from your Sustainer: Let, then, him 
who wills, believe in it, and let him who wills, reject it,"111 And in 17:15 it states: 
"Whoever chooses to follow the right path follows it but for his own good; and 
whoever goes astray goes but astray to his own hurt"112 the Prophet and his 
successors followed the commands of the Qur’an. An example of this can be when 
the caliphate Omar Ibn Al Khattab thought that a Christian woman who refused to 
join Islam might have understood his invitation as coercion, he stated the following: 
"O my Lord I have not intended to compel her, as I know that there must be no 
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compulsion in religion.... [R]ighteousness has been explained and distinguished from 
misguidance."113 
 
It is argued that the verses of the Qur’an also imply that a Muslim must not be 
coerced to stay in Islam.114 In the article “ The Dark Ages of Islam: Ijtihad, Apostasy 
and Human Rights in Contemporary Islamic Jurisprudence” by David A. Jordan the 
author argues that “Islam means submission to the will of God. Forcing one to remain 
Muslim in name and action only when their conscience and beliefs lay elsewhere is 
offensive to the very tenets of the Islamic faith.”115 
 
B.  The Diversity of Opinion in Regards to the Rules of Apostasy in Islamic 
Shari’a: 
The non-recognition of apostasy by Egyptian courts shows that they perceive 
apostasy as a prohibited act that should not be allowed. As stated earlier, the Egyptian 
Judiciary premises these legal consequences on their application of Islamic Law. This 
section will aim to show that there is disagreement in opinion regarding the non-
recognition of apostasy and the application of corporeal punishment in this life. This 
disagreement in opinion makes it a disputed rule within Islamic Shari’a. This section 
will start off by discussing the lack of temporal punishments for the act of apostasy or 
its non-recognition in the Holy Qur’an. Afterwards, this part will move to show in 
details why the rules regarding the non-recognition of apostasy and the application of 
temporal punishment are disputed rules in Islamic jurisprudence. To do so we will 
have to deal with the rules regarding the two types of apostasy, which are apostasy 
through abandonment of Islam or conversion to another religion and apostasy through 
committing blasphemy. The first fraction will discuss the difference of opinion 
regarding the rules pertaining to apostasy as abandonment of Islam or the conversion 
to a different religion. In this part, the argument is that the view of some of Islamic 
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jurists that apostasy is prohibited and results in temporal punishment is disputed 
because they confuse the prohibition of treason and its temporal punishment with 
apostasy. In the second fraction, we will look at the diversity of opinion in regards to 
considering blasphemy an automatic declaration of apostasy. 
1.  Nonexistence of Temporal Punishment for Apostasy in the Qur’an: 
 
The Holy Qur’an, as the primary source of Islamic Shari’a, does not mention a 
temporal or corporal punishment for apostasy, both types. The Qur’an mentioned 
clear temporal sanctions for a number of acts, including stealing and adultery. No 
similar verse stating the temporal sanction for apostasy is found in the Qur’an.116 The 
act of apostasy is mentioned thirteen times in the Qur’an. In each of the thirteen 
verses, there is no temporal sanction for apostasy. Specifically, there is no mention of 
the death penalty, which many Scholars argue is the punishment according to Shari’a, 
as a sanction for apostasy. The Qur’an only mentions a punishment in the afterlife, 
making apostasy according to the Qur’an act receiving religious retribution in the 
afterlife but no corporal punishment in this life.117 The Qur’an places moral 
punishment on the act of apostasy and not temporal one.118 The opinion of Scholar Al 
Awa summarizes the stance of the Qur’an in relation to apostasy. Al Awa states that: 
 
We do not find in the texts of the noble Qur’an related to apostasy any 
temporal punishment [specified] for the apostates. However we find therein 
repeated threats and strong warnings of punishment in the Hereafter. There is 
no doubt that such threats do not come unless they are related to a major sin. It 
is sufficient that Allah (glory be to Him)has promised the believers that He 
will forgive all of their sins, and has warned those who revert to unbelief after 
they become believers and then increase in their defiance in unbelief, that God 
will not forgive the and will not show them the true path. Apostasy in the view 
of the Qur’an is a major sin even though Qur’anic verses do not impose a 
temporal punishment.119 
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2. The Diversity of Opinion in Islamic Shari’a on Apostasy through Abandoning 
Islam: 
 
In this fraction we will look at a specific type of apostasy, which is abandoning Islam 
including converting to another religion, and the diversity of jurists’ opinion in its 
regards. This part will mainly discuss the relationship between treason and 
abandonment of Islam. This part basically argues that jurists’ calling for the 
prohibition of apostasy and the application of a temporal punishment on it in this life 
confused the act of abandoning Islam with the act of treason. This resulted in their 
application of the temporal punishment for the act of treason on Muslims who 
abandoned Islam and therefore became an apostate.  
 
a. Apostasy and Treason 
 
Mainstream Islamic Scholars argue that Islamic Shari’a prohibits apostasy and 
imposes a temporal punishment, the death penalty, on apostates.120 The Scholars 
mainly base their argument on the Hadith stating that “Whoever changes his religion, 
kill him.”121 Many modern scholars argue that this mainstream Islamic thought is 
confusing the act of treason with the act of apostasy through abandoning Islam; 
therefore they are wrongfully applying the prohibition of the act of treason and its 
punishment in this life on Muslims who commit apostasy through abandoning Islam. 
This part will aim to elaborate on this argument. First we will look at the 
interpretation of this Hadith in the religious and political context of its time and how 
it is meant as an enforcement of a corporal punishment fortreason and not apostasy 
through abandoning Islam.122 We will also look at the tradition of the prophet, the 
Sunnah, in regards to dealing with Muslims who abandoned Islam and how the 
prophet did not prohibit it and did not enforce a corporal punishment on them. 
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Second, we will look at the tradition of the Guided Caliphates and how they also did 
not prohibit abandoning Islam and did not enforce a corporal punishment on it but did 
so in regards to the act of treason. Third, we will look at the Hanafi School of Islamic 
jurisprudence did not apply a death penalty on Muslim women that abandoned Islam 
and how this also shows that the penalty was meant for the act of treason. Lastly, we 
will look at the general context in which the classical jurisprudence regarding the 
prohibition and the penalization of committing apostasy rose and how it also shows 
confusion between the act of treason and the act of apostasy.   
 
1) Understanding the prophet’s Hadith and Sunnah in its historical context: 
 
The temporal punishment for apostasy is based on a specific Hadith, mentioned 
earlier. Classical jurists fail to consider the context in which the Hadith was stated, as 
its context plays a major role in reaching its rightful interpretation. The Hadith was 
stated in a time when Islam was the main religion of the society. The structure of the 
society as whole, including politically, was based on Islam. Therefore, at the time of 
the prophet and throughout the period in which Islam dominated the society 
religiously and politically, the act of leaving Islam as a religion did not just simply 
mean apostasy but also included treason.123 An apostate was thus considered a traitor 
to the society and the state and therefore his elimination was required.124 In the article 
“Egyptian Cases of Blasphemy and Apostasy against Islam: Takfir al-Muslim” the 
author Declan O'Sullivan argues that: 
 
Clarifying that by definition apostasy differs from treason indicates that there 
has been a misunderstanding based on the assumption that the act of a person 
simply leaving their religion is equal to the act of physically rebeIling against 
the state authorities. Although the same behaviour is rebellious, in terms of 
rejecting the set rules, there is still a dramatic difference between the two 
forms of rejection. Apostasy is the passive change of a person's religion, and 
is not the same as undertaking murder, arson or rape, in order to cause public 
disorder and to attempt a coup d'ht, or a coup de main against the authority 
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who rules the community. Therefore, a precise definition of each form of act 
will show where a misguided use of the words portray the apostate as a person 
who has undertaken a crime they have not either technically, or practically, 
committed.125 
 
Other scholars explain the confusion between apostasy and treason through 
understanding the tribal system. The tribal system was the main system in the Arabian 
Peninsula at the time of the Prophet. With the rise of Islam as a religion and a 
political power, converts from other tribes not only join Islam as a religion but also as 
a political alliance. In addition, at that time there were significant amounts of conflict 
taking place between the Muslims and other tribes. Therefore, leaving Islam at that 
time not only meant apostasy but also meant treason through leaving the political 
alliance and becoming an enemy.126 
 
The misinterpretation of the Hadith of the Prophet is also evident by the fact 
that the Prophet never killed a person specifically for their conversion from Islam. 
The Prophet never imposed the death penalty on an apostate because of his apostasy 
but it was always accompanied with treason.127 Moreover, a Hadith mentioned in the 
Bukhari collection told of a man who came to Medina and converted to Islam but 
later decided that he wanted to return to his religion. The Hadith states that the 
Prophet did not impose the death penalty on the man but instead let him go.128 
 
Other Hadiths also show the relationship between apostasy and treason at the 
time of the Prophet. One Hadith states, “A man who leaves Islam and engages in 
fighting against God and His Prophet shall be executed, crucified, or exiled.”129 This 
Hadith basically shows the strong relationship between apostasy and treason at that 
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time. It also shows that the death penalty was not imposed as a penalty for merely 
committing apostasy but for committing treason.130 Moreover, the Hadith stating 
 
The blood of a Muslim who professes that there is no God but Allah and I am 
His Messenger is sacrosanct except in three cases: in the case of a married 
adulterer, one who has killed a human being, and one who has abandoned his 
religion, while splitting himself off from the community.131 
 
The statement ‘while splitting himself off from the community’ is argued to 
mean “one who actively boycotts and challenges the community and its legitimate 
leadership.”132 Therefore, this Hadith also proves that the death penalty is not to be 
imposed for simply committing apostasy but for also committing treason.  
 
2) Understanding the tradition of the Caliphates in its historical context: 
 
The relationship between treason and apostasy, resulting in the application of the 
punishment of the first on the second, can be explained even more by understanding 
the tradition of the Caliphates in its historical Context. Many argue that the ‘wars of 
apostasy’ fought by the first Caliphate, Abu Bakr Al Seddiq, are evidence of the 
criminality of apostasy. Again this argument lacks a deeper analysis of the wars. The 
wars were not of a religious nature but mainly of a political one. After the death of the 
Prophet, many tribes declared their rebellion against Medina. Some of the tribes 
abandoned Islam, while others did not but decided that they will not pay the taxes 
(zakat) to the main authority in Medina. Moreover, some of the tribes did not even 
have a Muslim majority, but did have an alliance with Medina. Therefore, these wars 
should not be seen as ones against apostates but ones against tribes that rebelled 
against the main authority, hence committing treason.133 This too proves that the 
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corporal punishment in this life was a result of treason and not apostasy through the 
abandonment of Islam.  
 
3)  Stance of Hanafi School in Regards to Female Apostates: 
One can look at the disagreement between classical jurists in regards to the 
enforcement of the corporal punishment in this life on Muslims women who abandon 
Islam and find more support to why the temporal punishment was actually for 
treason. The Hanafi School of Islamic Shari’a rules that the death penalty should not 
be applied on femaleMuslims that apostate by abandoning Islam. The School argues 
that the penalty should not be applied on women because they cannot carry weapons. 
Moreover, they argue that women should not be killed because of the Prophet’s 
general prohibition against killing women.134 This stance shows that the prohibition 
and the temporal penalty on the abandonment of Islam were not related to the act of 
apostasy itself but to the consequences of it, which is committing treason by 
becoming an enemy of Islam and the state. Therefore, it shows that the criminality of 
apostasy was not because of converting from Islam but because the apostate will 
consequently commit treason, due to the structure of the society back then.  
b. Political Context in which the Classical Jurisprudence on Apostasy 
Developed: 
For a full understanding of the wrongful prohibition and temporal punishment of 
abandonment of Islam, one must look at the context in which the classical 
jurisprudence regarding it developed. During the thirty years after the death of the 
Prophet the Muslim, conquests increased. Therefore, with the diversity of cultures 
and traditions within the expanding umbrella of Islam, many theological and political 
debates arose. Muslims were discussing what makes a true Muslim and who has the 
right to represent religious and political authority.135 Diversity in opinions and 
schools increased during the Umayyad period. Examples of the diverse schools would 
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be the Kharijis and the Murji’is. The Kharijis believed that a person who committed a 
major sin or fought against another Muslim is consequently an apostate.136 On the 
other hand, the Murji’is believed that the person’s faith should not be judged based on 
their actions but rather their words.137More diversity appeared with the rise of groups 
like the Mu’tazili and the Traditionalists. The Mu’tazili believed that the Qur’an was 
not the word of God but was created by God.138 On the other hand, the Traditionalists, 
through a literalistic understanding of the Qur’an, believed that the Qur’an was the 
word of God.139 The political powers at the time used the diversity of opinions to their 
advantage, by accepting one theological position and renouncing the other as an act of 
apostasy through the abandonment of Islam. For example, during the Abbasid period, 
Caliph Mutawakkil supported the Mu’tazili view.140 Later, when Traditionalists had 
more power, Mu’tazili views were denounced and its followers were prosecuted as 
Muslims that abandoned Islam. Jurists from other schools called many leading 
Islamic Scholars apostates due to their support of a different theological opinion.141 
The diversity of theological schools as well as their declaration of the apostasy of 
others and the use of such diversity for political gains is the climate in which the 
classical jurisprudence on apostasy developed. Therefore, it is safe to understand that 
this climate, in which religious and political authority were intertwined completely, 
the punishment for religious and political disagreement was the same, the death 
penalty. This climate again proves an existing wrongful confusion between the 
prohibition and criminalization of treason and apostasy.  
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c. Diversity of Opinion in Islamic Shari’a on Blasphemy and Its Relationship 
to Apostasy: 
As stated earlier, in this part we will look at the second type of apostasy, which is 
through committing blasphemy, and the stance of Islamic Shari’a in regards to this 
issue. In the First Chapter it was stated that the Egyptian Government and Judiciary 
use articles 98(f), 160 and 161 of the Penal Code to criminalize blasphemy or 
unorthodox religious statements. Moreover, in the case of Nasr Hamed Abou Zayd, 
the courts equated the unorthodox statements, or blasphemy, found in the books of 
the defendant to an act of apostasy. This section aims to understand the stance of 
Islamic Shari’a in regards to blasphemy and its relationship to apostasy. This full 
understanding is essential to know whether or not Egypt is in fact prohibiting 
blasphemy, and in some cases defining it as an act of apostasy, based on undisputed 
rules of Islamic Shari’a. This section will address this issue by firstly understanding 
the meaning of blasphemy in Islamic Shari’a, including what was stated in its regards 
in the Holy Qur’an. Secondly, we will look at the stance of classical Islamic 
jurisprudence in regards to the right of Muslims or the state to punish blasphemers, 
through the concepts of the Right of God and the Right of Man. Finally, we will 
address the diversity of opinion among Islamic jurists in regards to considering the 
act of blasphemy an act of apostasy. This section basically aims to show that 
considering blasphemy as apostasy is not one of the undisputed rules of Islamic 
Shari’a, therefore it should not be considered part of Egyptian public policy and it 
does not have to be applied. 
1) Sab Allah w Sab Al Rasoul 
In classical Islamic jurisprudence scholars discussed the use of foul language in 
regards to the prophet and in regards to God, Sab Al Rasoul and Sab Allah 
respectively.142 Both these actions and the use of foul language against Islam as a 
whole represent what is now commonly referred to as blasphemy. The Holy Qur’an 
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does not mention a temporal punishment of blasphemy in any of its verses.143 
Moreover, no temporal sanction can be found stated directly in the statements of the 
Prophet.144 This action was penalized during the post-prophetic period. The scholars 
at that time discussed the nature of such an action and its consequences. Some jurists 
saw insulting God or the Prophet or Islam as an act of apostasy; hence the blasphemer 
should be sentenced to death. Other scholars ruled that the blasphemer is not an 
apostate but could face the death penalty simply for their offence of blasphemy. 
Lastly, some scholars saw that the act of blasphemy removes the blasphemer from the 
fold of Islam, but did not specify a punishment for this.145 It is argued, that jurists see 
blasphemy as a threat to the state and an attack on it, making its punishment in this 
life a must.146 This shows that blasphemy was also not just understood within a 
religious perspective but also from a political one.  Moreover, the punishment of 
blasphemy in this life was used to eliminate dissent among the Muslims.147 This also 
shows that the temporal punishment for the act of blasphemy, whether it constituted 
apostasy or not, is not a matter of agreement among Islamic jurists; therefore, it does 
not have to be applied in Egyptian criminal law. 
2) The Right of God and the Right of Man: 
In dealing with questions regarding blasphemy, jurists distinguished between the 
person who insults the Prophet and the person who insults God. Insulting God was 
considered a violation of the right of God, while insulting the Prophet was considered 
a violation of the right of Man. 148 Jurists argued that Muslims have more 
responsibility in punishing the person that violates the right of Man, because the 
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Prophet cannot punish that person himself and cannot forgive him. While in the case 
of the violation of the right of God, the person can ask for forgiveness and repent.149 
The distinction is hard to accept because it assumes that only the Prophet can 
forgive the violator of the right of Man, it ignores the role of God in forgiving that 
violation. These two concepts can be related now to the Hisba law, according to 
which, Muslims have the obligation to promote good and forbid evil. The Muslims 
would then have to forbid the violation of the Right of Man. Even if the distinction 
between the Right of God and the Right of Man, as well as the fact that forgiveness is 
impossible to attain after violating the right of Man, are accepted; Egyptian law gives 
the State not only the right to impose punishment in cases of the violation of the Right 
of Man, but to also impose punishment in the cases of the violation of the Right of 
God. Therefore, the Egyptian State does not follow the mainstream jurisprudence, 
which in itself is not even undisputed, in regards to the punishment of blasphemy. 
3)  Blasphemy As Apostasy 
As stated earlier, in the case of Nasr Hamed Abou Zayd, Egyptian Courts stated that 
the unorthodox statements mentioned in the books of the defendant are proof of his 
apostasy. Therefore, the courts equated between the acts of blasphemy and apostasy, 
ruling that the first leads to the second. The court even stated that the only way Abou 
Zayd can prove that he is not an apostate is through denying all of the controversial 
statements and that just stating that he is a Muslim will not be sufficient.  
The equation between blasphemy and apostasy exists in Islamic Jurisprudence but 
should not be considered an undisputed rule of Islamic Shari’a.  As stated in the 
previous section, some jurist of classical Islamic jurisprudence saw that a blasphemer 
is consequently an apostate and the legal punishment for apostasy should be applied 
to him. Others disagreed seeing that blasphemy does not automatically equate to 
apostasy.150 With the lack of a clear Qur’anic or Sunna command for a temporal 
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punishment for blasphemy, a great number of jurists see that blasphemy is a moral 
issue that only has a punishment in the Hereafter.151 This shows that the Egyptian 
courts treated the equation of blasphemy with apostasy in the Nasr Abou Zayd case as 
an application of rules of Islamic Shari’a, while they were only applying one 
understanding of the rules and not an undisputed one. 
C. Diversity of Opinion in Islamic Shari’a in Regards to Apostasy and its Legal 
Consequences on Personal Status: 
After proving that Islam is a religion that embraces freedom of belief and that the 
rules regarding apostasy, in both its types, are in fact of a disputed nature in Islamic 
Shari’a, we now move to analyzing the disputed nature of the rules regarding the 
application of the legal consequences of apostasy. Egyptian Courts have sustained 
that the rules regarding the consequences of apostasy on personal status are a part of 
the undisputed rules of Shari’a. The courts failed to give further elaboration on the 
Shari’a bases used for understanding these rules. This section will look at the rules of 
Islamic Shari’a in regards to the consequences of apostasy on personal status, 
specifically marriage, inheritance and property. This section does not create a 
distinction between the method by which apostasy is considered to be committed, 
whether blasphemy or abandonment of Islam. According to Egyptian courts both 
types of apostasy lead to the legal requirement to apply the legal consequences on 
personal status.  
 
1. Consequences of Apostasy on Marriage: 
In classical Islamic jurisprudence the apostasy of one of the spouses leads to the 
separation of the couple, according to the Hanafi and Malaki schools of fiqh.152 While 
in the case of the apostasy of both spouses, according to the Shafi’is and Hanbali 
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schools of fiqh, the couple should also be separated.153 On the other hand, the Hanafi 
School does not require the separation of the couple when both spouses commit 
apostasy.154 Moreover, some jurists argue that the apostasy of the woman does not 
lead to the dissolution of the marriage and others argue that the apostasy of the wife 
turns her into a slave.155 The diversity of opinions regarding the details of the issue 
shows that the matter is not one of consensus. Egyptian courts do not elaborate on the 
Shari’a bases they use for the separation of the couple, except for saying that in the 
case of the apostasy of the man the Muslim woman cannot stay married to a non-
Muslim; hence they should be separated. The court deals with the issue as if there are 
no disputes in regards to its details, while in fact the details are not a matter of 
consensus.Therefore, the general rule state by the Court of Cassation, says that an 
apostate’s marriage is dissolved and they cannot remarry, even a non-Muslim, is in 
fact not part of the undisputed rules of Shari’a that make up the Egyptian public 
policy. 
2. Consequences of Apostasy on Inheritance 
Like the consequences of apostasy on marriage,its consequences on inheritance are 
also a matter of diversity of opinion. With the lack of Qur’anic verses regarding the 
issue jurists reached, through ijtihad, a number of rules on inheritance and apostasy. 
Many jurists argue that the apostate does not have the right to inherit, even from 
members of the new religion he joined.156Hanafi jurists argue that the apostasy of a 
person consequently makes him a member of the enemy territory therefore he is 
considered as legally dead.157 Jurists also have diverse opinions in regards to 
inheriting an apostate. Some argue that all what was owned by the apostate is given to 
the state’s treasury after his death.158  Others argue that anything that the apostate 
owned before his apostasy, should be inherited by his Muslim heirs, while anything 
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that was owned after his apostasy is given to the state.159 Lastly, some argue that the 
Muslim heirs regardless of when the ownership started should inherit everything that 
the apostate owned.160 Therefore, the diversity of opinions regarding the 
consequences of apostasy on inheritance shows that there is no undisputed Shari’a 
rule regarding the issue; hence, it should not be considered part of the Egyptian public 
policy.  
3. Consequences of Apostasy on Property 
As states earlier, the Egyptian Court of Cassation stated that in Islamic Shari’a an 
apostate loses control over their property until he repents.161 Although the court states 
it as a general rule, this also is a matter of diverse opinions amongst jurists. Jurists of 
the Malaki and the Hanbali schools of fiqh, and some of the Shafi’i school, argue that 
the control of the apostate over his property is stopped until such time as he repents 
and returns to Islam.162 Some jurists argue that the property of the apostates 
automatically becomes ‘spoils of war’ and cannot be returned to him them even if he 
repents.163 Other jurists, such as Hanafi jurist Abu Yusuf and Shaybani, argue that the 
right of ownership of property of the person should not be affected at all by 
committing apostasy.164 Again this shows that the consequences of apostasy on the 
right to own property is not one of the undisputed rules of Shari’a that make up 
Egyptian public policy.  
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VI. Apostasy as a Legal Tool against Religious and Political Dissent: 
It is already clear that the rules regarding apostasy and its legal consequences are 
disputed rules of Islamic Shari’a. Apostasy rules are used by the state for more than 
the purpose stated by the Judiciary, which is protecting public policy. Evidence 
suggests that state authorities employ the legal devices of apostasy to prevent any 
departure from mainstream state backed readings of religion and politics. The 
Egyptian state is abusing the laws of apostasy, including blasphemy laws. The abuse 
of the rules regarding apostasy and its legal consequences has been taking place since 
the development of the Islamic jurisprudence in regards to apostasy, for example 
during the Umayyad and the Abbasid period. It is argued that abuse of apostasy legal 
devices takes place by almost every country that has them.165 Apostasy legal devices 
are basically used to eliminate opposition. The opposition most of the time is both 
religious and political because of the official role that Islamic law plays in the state 
and society. The opposition could be represented in religious minorities, reformists or 
any anyone that goes against the mainstream state backed understanding of religion 
and politics.166 
Scholars have warned against the possibility of abusing laws of apostasy and 
blasphemy.  Apostasy laws can easily be open to misuse, if they are used by any 
political group to eliminated political opposition. This sort of elimination can take 
place through accusing the opposition of apostasy, including blasphemy, with the aim 
of removing them from the political field.167  As stated earlier, the abuse of apostasy 
laws by political powers is not a novelty that rose in modern Islamic states but it has 
been taking place since the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties.  For example, Ghaylan 
al-Dimanshqi was executed by the order of Caliph Abdul Malik bin Marwan for the 
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accusation of heresy and Ahmed bin Nasir was executed by the order of Caliph al-
Wathiq because of the same accusation.168 
In Egypt the Nasr Hamed Abou Zayd case is a perfect example of the abuse of 
apostasy laws by political powers. Although the case was not filed by the political 
power representing the state authority, it was still filed by a political power aiming to 
eliminate opposition. It is argued that the case was filed by the Islamist lawyers with 
the aim of fighting the interpretation of Islam put forward by Abu Zayed, as to insure 
that their interpretation of Islam is of dominance and hence their understanding of 
Islam will not be challenged within the Egyptian society. Therefore, their legitimacy 
as the ones talking on behalf of the religion will not be challenged and subsequently 
their control and dominance over the society would be stable.169 Moreover, this case 
shows that the judiciary is the authority that has the legal right to decide whether or 
not a person’s view is in accordance with the mainstream understanding of religion. 
The judiciary turns into the decision maker in regards to what constitutes the right 
interpretation of Islam. The judiciary is no longer deciding on legal issues but also on 
religious ones. 
 
This Chapter will discuss how legal devices of apostasy can be abused in Egypt 
and how the Egyptian authorities are already abusing it. This Chapter will start by 
addressing how Egyptian authorities abuse the blasphemy articles in the Penal Code 
and use them against religious converts and reformists. Then the near-monopoly of 
the Public Prosecution office over sending the apostasy and blasphemy cases to court 
will be addressed. This will include looking again at the Hisba law and its 
amendments. This chapter aims to show that the legal devices of apostasy in Egypt 
are used to eliminate dissent and insure the control of the state over the interpretation 
of religion and politics. 
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A. Use of the Blasphemy Penal Code Articles against Religious Converts and 
Dissent: 
Egyptian state authorities have already abused the Penal Code articles regarding 
apostasy. The state authorities use these penal articles to punish religious converts 
and reformists. With the lack of a penal article prohibiting the act of apostasy, in the 
form of the abandonment of Islam, or religious dissent the Egyptian state abuses the 
blasphemy article to penalize any opposition to its mainstream readings of religious 
affairs. In the study titled “Prohibited identities” issued by the Egyptian Initiative for 
Personal Rights (EIPR) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) a quick analysis of the 
abuse of the blasphemy prohibition article takes place. The report states that   
The government has used Article 98(f) of the Penal Code to criminalize 
actions or other expressions of unorthodox religious views, including 
conversion from Islam….As the testimonies in this report indicate, officials 
have interpreted this article to proscribe conversion from Islam on the grounds 
that such conversion disparages Islam and is thus incompatible with public 
order.170 
This quick analysis gives an indication of how the executive branch in the 
Egyptian state, with the lack of a specific legal article prohibiting apostasy, uses the 
blasphemy article as a legal base for the arrest of the converts from Islam. In the 
report it is stated that a number of converts, apostates as the government sees them, 
were arrested based on article 98 (f). The government argues that by converting the 
person is denying Islam. They argue that announcing such a change in belief and 
stating the reasons for it are actions that qualify as blasphemy.171 Therefore, this 
shows that the state not only sees that blasphemy could be an automatic act of 
apostasy, like the AbouZayd case, but it also sees that apostasy could be an automatic  
act of blasphemy.  
The state also abuses the articles to eliminate reformists. For example, in 2007 a 
group of men calling for peaceful reform in the Islamic world were arrested in Cairo 
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because of their ideas.172 The police took the men from a house belonging to one of 
them. At least one man was accused of violating article 98 (f), regarding the use of 
religion for the promotion of extremists ideas.173 Another man was accused of 
“rejecting the penalty of apostasy.”174 The men were imprisoned for 20 days, 
questioned by the Public Prosecution and their families and lawyers were not given 
access to them.175 Moreover, the Penal Code articles were also used on members of 
the Shi’ie sect of Islam, seeing as how some core ideas of their belief can be seen as 
extreme in relation to the Sunni sect, which is the majority Muslim Sect in Egypt.176 
B. The Near-Monopoly of the Public Prosecution over Apostasy Cases: 
Not only does the state abuse the penal articles regarding blasphemy and uses them to 
eliminate religious and political dissent, represented in religious converts and 
reformists, the state also has a near-monopoly over sending apostasy cases to the 
judiciary. These cases include both types of apostasy, which are abandoning Islam 
and blasphemy.  This part of this chapter will discuss this near-monopoly of the state. 
Moreover, we will look at the blasphemy cases that took place during the presidency 
of Morsi to elaborate on the how the near-monopoly of the state over sending 
apostasy cases to the judiciary insures the legal devices of apostasy can be abused for 
the interest of the state authority. 
The Public Prosecutor office “acts as public attorney before criminal courts with 
the right to file criminal actions. It was given the right by the Egyptian legislation to 
initiate action even if plaintiff has relinquished his right to do so.”177 The Public 
Prosecution is part of the Egyptian state and has been a reflection of the political 
power in control of the state.  
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As stated earlier, the Public Prosecution is the only office with the capacity to file 
a blasphemy case, claiming a violation of article 98 (f), 160 and/or 161 of the penal 
code. Moreover, with the amendments to the Hisba law in 1996, the Public 
Prosecution became the only office with the capacity to file Hisba cases which regard 
the right of god, or the forbidding wrong.178 Therefore cases regarding Hisba can only 
be filed by the Public Prosecution office or a person with direct interest in the case,179 
for example, the earlier mentioned case of the woman asking for the dissolvent of her 
marriage because of her husband’s reconversion to Christianity. These two facts make 
sending the apostasy cases, in the form of blasphemy cases based the violation of the 
penal code or personal status cases based on the violation of the rules of Islamic law, 
to the courts a matter almost exclusively in the hands of the Public Prosecutor.180 
Baring in mind of the circumstances regarding apostasy cases in Egypt, the state 
basically now has a near-monopoly over using the legal devices of apostasy for its 
own advantage. The very likely abuse of the legal devices of apostasy by one group 
against another, the fact that the Egyptian state is already doing so and the near-
monopoly of the state over filing the related cases to the courts are the main 
circumstance that should be kept in mind. Therefore, whoever is in control of the 
state, and consequently the Public Prosecution office, will have control over what 
constitutes the mainstream understanding of apostasy.  this mainstream understanding 
of apostasy is most likely abused in regards to defining blasphemy, in the Penal Code 
or through understanding blasphemy as apostasy as was done in the Nasr Hamed 
Abou Zayd case. For example, in 2001 Islamists lawyers filed a complaint in the 
Public Prosecution calling for filing a case against Nawal Al Saadawi, a prominent 
Egyptian writer, to divorce her from her husband because of her apostasy.181 The 
complaint was filed because of the statements put forward by Al Saadawi. Al 
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Saadawi called the pilgrimage to Mecca a "vestige of pagan practices"182 and argued 
against the Islamic inheritance law in which a woman takes half of what the man 
takes.183 The plaintiff filled the case directly in the court and not through the public 
prosecution. The Public Prosecution sent a memo to the court stating that the case is 
baseless. The court later dismissed the case because it was not filed through the 
Public Prosecution, which is in accordance to the amendments to the Hisba law.184  
This shows that if the Islamists were in power their understanding and agenda would 
have been followed by the Public Prosecution and the case would have been 
supported by the State. Therefore, the case would have taken place and resulted in 
defining apostasy of Al Saadawi by the act of blasphemy and the court would have 
ruled for the dissolution of marriage, like the Abou Zayd case.  
 
1.The Presidency of Morsi: 
 
The Presidency of Morsi represents a period of time where the Islamists had control 
over the state and subsequently over the Public Prosecution. That control led to a full 
manifestation of the misuse of the apostasy legal devices, specifically blasphemy 
cases. In a report studying the blasphemy cases, that took place after the 25th of 
January Revolution, a number of conclusions are reached. First, there is an increase in 
complaints filed to the Public Prosecution by non-officials regular citizens. Second, 
there is a prosecution of many ordinary citizens and not just public figures or 
scholars, unlike what happened in previous eras. Third, in many cases the defendants 
were not members of a minority group or a sect contradicting the beliefs of the 
Majority but they were Sunni Muslims.185 The report shows that the increase was not 
just in the complaints filed but in the ones forwarded by the Public Prosecution to the 
courts. Moreover, it is mentioned that state authorities failed to protect the defendants 
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of such cases from attacks on them or their property, the report calls it “failure 
because of intolerance” “بصعتلاا ننولب لشف”.186 Both of these factors are reflective of the 
state and its tolerance and encouragement of such claims and limitations on freedoms 
of expression and belief. The state used the penal code as a tool to limit religious 
dissent. Any person that seemed to express opposing views to the state backed 
reading of religion was faced with the possibility of criminal charges under the 
blasphemy articles.   
 
This presidential period is a proof of the inclination of the Public Prosecution to 
the abuse of blasphemy articles to eliminate opposition. The research for this thesis 
has failed to find a Hisba personal status complaint that was filed to the Public 
Prosecution in this period. Still it is safe to assume that if one of these cases was filed 
at that period it would have been transferred by the Public Prosecution to the courts 
and would have reached the same verdict as the Abou Zayd case.  
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VII. The Possibility of Change in Egyptian Jurisprudence and the Judges' 
choice not to:  
As stated in details in the first chapter, Egyptian courts have almost always applied 
the most conservative understating of apostasy rules in Islamic Shari’a. This most 
conservative understanding is applied in all fields of Egyptian law. Still, there are 
rulings that can be considered an exception to the Egyptian jurisprudence. These 
rulings show the possibility of accepting the diversity of opinion regarding apostasy 
in Islamic Shari’a and the application of more lenient rulings.  In this chapter we will 
look rulingno.529 issued in 2012 by Agouza District Court, which can be considered 
an exception to Egyptian jurisprudence. We will then move to examine why the 
majority of judges choose not to apply a similar legal logic to the Agouza ruling but 
stand by the application of the most conservative understanding apostasy rules in 
Islamic Shari’a. 
A. An Exception to Conservative Jurisprudence: 
The ruling no.529 issued in 2012 by Agouza District Court is an example of the 
possibility to apply a different understanding of apostasy in Islamic Shari’a, which is 
much more in accordance with the diversity of opinion. The ruling was issued in 
regards to the accusation of actor Adel Imam of breaching article 98 (f) of the Penal 
Code, by committing blasphemy.  In the ruling the judge takes a step away from the 
rest of the Egyptian jurisprudence.  The judge challenges the notion of abiding by 
previous rulings of higher courts.187  In almost all of the cases mentioned in the first 
chapter the judges do not go into the details of how they reached the interpretation of 
the law. In most cases the judges just refer to previous judgments by higher courts 
and apply the rules stated by them.188 In The Agouza case the judge argues that 
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abiding by precedent reached by higher courts is not a legal requirement in Egyptian 
law. The judge states that the sources of law in Egypt, according to the civil law, are 
legislation, Islamic Shari’a and equity and that there is not mention of precedent.189 
Therefore, the Egyptian legal system allows the judges to divert from previous 
rulings, including looking into Islamic Shari’a and reaching the applicable rules. 
Bearing that in mind, the judge goes on to interpret article 98 (f) and elaborates on the 
legal reasoning behind his interpretation. The judge is not just basing his 
understanding of the law on precedent but he analyzes the law, the intention of its 
drafters and other aspects to reach correct interpretation. The Judge also does not 
follow precedent in finding the applicable rule of Islamic Shari’a. In the ruling the 
judge challenges the mainstream interpretation of Islamic Shari’a rules regarding 
apostasy and their allegedly undisputed nature. The judge mentions that the apostasy 
rules, including blasphemy, in Islamic Shari’a are in fact of a disputed nature and that 
there is no mention of a temporal punishment for it in the Quran.190 Moreover, he 
speaks of the stance of Islam in regards to religious tolerance and freedom. Most 
importantly, the judge believed that his role is to interpret the codified law itself, 
article 98 (f), and not Islamic Shari’a. The judge saw that this as rule of written law 
that might give rise to Islamic Shari’a. By interpreting the statutory law the judge did 
not discuss the criminalization of the act of blasphemy, but he only its criminalization 
when it takes place with the intention of causing social strife. The judge did not 
unnecessary dwell in Islamic Shari’a but stuck to his role of interpreting the statutory 
law. 
The Agouza case shows that the Egyptian legal system does not require judges to 
abide by precedent and the understanding of the law stated in them. The case shows 
that the law actually gives the judges the right to interpret the codified law and in the 
case of the lack of one, like in the case of apostasy, the judge looks into Islamic 
Shari’a to find the applicable rules. The legal system only requires the judges to abide 
by the law and not the interpretation of it that was reached in the previous rulings. 
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Moreover, nothing requires the judges to accept the interpretation of Islamic Shari’a 
reached by previous rulings and not challenge it. The law gives the judges the space 
to reach the rules and the interpretations themselves. 
The Agouza case shows that the judges have the right and the possibility to apply 
a more lenient interpretation of apostasy rules in Islamic Shari’a but they do not. 
Consequently, the question rises why do the judges choose to apply the most 
conservative interpretation of apostasy rules in Islamic Shari’a?  
B. Understanding the Choice of the Judges: 
As stated in details in previous chapters, Islamic Shari’a includes a diversity of jurist 
opinions pertaining to apostasy and its legal consequences.  One can safely argue that 
the rules regarding apostasy are in fact disputed. With such obvious diversity of 
opinion, that only requires sufficient research into the issue of apostasy in Islamic 
Shari’a, why do Egyptian judges choose to apply the most conservative interpretation 
of Islamic Shari’a rules pertaining to apostasy?  Not only do Egyptian judges not 
admit the diversity of opinion in regards to the rules of apostasy, but they also choose 
to apply the conservative interpretation of Islamic Shari’a regarding the topic. This 
section will analyze the possible reason behind the judges choosing the conservative 
rules and not choose the possible lenient rule, like the Agouza ruling.  
To understand the reason behind the choice of the judges one must understand 
more what they claim to be the legal base to their rulings. By analyzing the rulings of 
most of the Egyptian judges in apostasy cases it is noticed that they are based on two 
justifications. The legal precedent of higher courts and what the rulings see as ‘the 
rules agreed upon in Islamic Shari’a’. These two justifications give us an insight into 
what the judges put forward as the logic behind the rulings; therefore, the logic 
behind their choice.  
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1.  Role of Precedent: 
The massive difference between the majority of the court ruling regarding apostasy 
and the Agouza ruling is based on the legal importance they give to precedent. As 
stated earlier the majority of judges base their interpretation of the law, including 
Islamic Shari’a rules, on precedent of higher courts.191 The judges look at precedent 
to find the interpretation of the law and sometimes, in issues of Islamic Shari’a, the 
legal rule itself. In the majority of the cases the judges just cite the legal precedent. 
They do not state the legal logic behind accepting these previous rulings as the right 
interpretation of the law.As stated in the Agouza ruling and the Egyptian civil law, 
precedent is not a source of law. It can be usedto find the interpretation for the law 
but that does not mean that the judge has to abide by it. The judges choose not 
challenge the case law, they do not even elaborate on their choice to abide by it. The 
judges consciously give up their right to interoperate the law themselves and easily 
follow the precedent. This shows that the majority of judges abide by the previous 
case law not out of obligation but out of conviction and without giving a legal logic 
behind this conviction. 
2. Selective understanding of Apostasy Law in Islamic Shari’a: 
In addition to basing their rulings on precedent, the judges also claim that the rules 
they apply are the ones agreed upon in Islamic Shari’a. But what knowledge do 
Egyptian judges have of Islamic Shari’a? And is scholarly knowledge of Islamic 
Shari’a truly needed for the judges to comprehend the disputed nature of apostasy 
rules? 
Egyptian Judges, like lawyers, receive their education in law schools. These 
schools offer the Students an education in the different fields of law, including 
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Islamic Shari’a. Still, the Islamic Shari’a education offered in law school is not 
enough to make the student an Islamic Shari’a jurist. For example, in the Law School 
of Ain Shams University the students take 10 courses every year, only one of which is 
Islamic Shari’a.192 The students do not receive detailed education in Islamic Shari’a 
as that received by students in Al Azhar University. Prior to the establishment of 
Egyptian law schools in their current form, Al Azhar University educated its students 
in Islamic law to do both the functions of an Islamic jurist and a judge.193 That intense 
education in Islamic law is not given to students in law schools. These students, that 
become both judges and lawyers, only have a relatively limited understanding of 
Islamic law.  
This limited knowledge and understanding of Islamic law by Egyptian judges 
might be another reason behind their choice to apply one of the most conservative 
interpretations of Islamic Shari’a rules in regards to apostasy and claiming that it is 
the one agreed on my Islamic jurists or ‘undisputed’. They do not have the education 
or the knowledge to know the historical context of these rules, their diversity and so 
on. The stated reason is not very convincing seeing as the author of this thesis also 
only received education in a law school and did not receive any professional Islamic 
law education that would make her an Islamic jurist. Still, by conducting sufficient 
research regarding the rules of Islamic Shari’a pertaining to apostasy it was easily 
concluded that these rules are in fact disputed and are not a matter of agreement by 
Islamic jurists. Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the Egyptian judges also 
choose to not genuinely look into the disputed nature of Islamic law rules pertaining 
to apostasy but chose to follow the mainstream understanding, which is the most 
conservative one. 
Why would the judges choose to follow the precedent and not challenge the 
mainstream understanding of apostasy rules? The only logical answer would that the 
precedent and the mainstream understanding are compatible with what they judges 
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believe the law should be. Still, that is not how the legal system operates. The judges 
do not have the right not to elaborate on the legal logic behind their choice to apply 
the most conservative understanding of apostasy rules. The precedent is not legally 
binding and they can easily find out the true disputed nature of the rules in Islamic 
Shari’a. The judges should elaborate on the legal logic stated in their rulings so that 
their biases are out in the open. Therefore, it would be obvious that the rulings is not 
based on binding law but based on a choice of the judge that can be challenge using 
the law.  
This ruling shows that the Egyptian judges applying the conservative mainstream 
rules of Islamic Shari’a in regards to apostasy are doing so out of choice. They have 
the legal capacity to challenge the precedence and to genuinely look into the disputed 
nature of apostasy rules in Islamic Shari’a. The judges simply choose not to. They 
choose to be a tool of ensuring the application of one of the most conservative 
understanding of Islamic law. They chose to not use their legal function to genuinely 
judge interpret the law and apply it. They choose to support a logic that creates a gap 
between Islamic Shari’a and human rights. They choose to breach the Egyptian 
international obligation to article 18 of the ICCPR. 
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VIII. Conclusion: 
In conclusion, Egypt is in violation of its international obligation to ensure freedom of 
belief. The state’s argument that Islamic Shari’a does not allow apostasy and sets 
legal consequences on it is in fact based on an incorrect understanding of Islamic 
Shari’a. As stated in chapter IV the rules regarding apostasy and its legal 
consequences are a matter of diversity of opinion amongst Islamic jurists. The 
application of such rules is not a matter of legal obligation as they are not part 
undisputed rules of Islamic Shari’a and therefore not part of Egyptian public policy, 
but rather a matter of limited understanding of Islamic Shari’a. Islamic Shari’a does 
not require a temporal punishment for apostasy or legal consequences resulting from 
it. Islamic Shari’a prohibits religious coercion and acknowledges that belief is an 
issue between the individual and God. Islamic Shari’a does not order not allowing the 
recognition of apostasy. The Judges choose to ignore the stance of Islam in regards to 
religious tolerance and freedom of belief. They choose to not recognize the context in 
which the jurisprudence regarding apostasy was developed. They choose to not 
understand the historic relationship between apostasy and treason and the subsequent 
confusion in regards to punishment.  
The Judges following this limited understanding of Islamic Shari’a leads to 
acts that oppose the foundations of Islam as this constitutes religious coercion.  
Moreover, following this limited understanding leads to wrongfully limiting the right 
to freedom of belief through not allowing the recognition of apostasy and the 
application of legal consequences on apostates which punish them through ‘civil 
death’. Adhering to this limited understanding makes the legal framework of apostasy 
simply a tool in the hand of the state to eliminate dissent. It makes it a tool in the 
hands of the conservative judges to use it as a legal base for their biases. Following of 
this limited understanding creates a society where calling for reform and expression 
of one’s thoughts are punishable actions, through the criminalization of blasphemy 
and its equation with apostasy. The following of such an understanding limits the 
rights of religious minorities. Apostasy laws, including blasphemy, that are applied in 
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Egypt now are killing diversity within the Egyptian State and bluntly violating the 
rights of its citizens. Moreover, the application of the legal consequences of apostasy 
are seen by many scholars as punishments. For example, in the article "Islam, Till 
Death Do You Part? Rethinking Apostasy Laws Under Islamic Law and International 
Legal Obligations” it is stated that “Another punishment is civil-death, which 
eliminates certain civil rights including: invalidating an apostate's marriage or 
stripping property or inheritance rights.”194 The article continues to argue that in 
Egypt, apostates have two options: the first is to express their true beliefs and 
consequently face civil-death and the second is to not express their true beliefs and 
commit the crime of fraud in official documents.195 It is clear that the civil-death 
resulting from apostasy deters citizens from stating their true beliefs to the state.196 
Therefore, the legal framework of apostasy clearly limits the life of Egyptian citizens. 
Islam, the main source of Egyptian legislation, ensures freedom of belief. The 
only undisputed rule in Islamic Shari’a regarding apostasy is that it is a sin that will 
be punished by God in the afterlife. This is the understanding of Islamic Shari’a that 
the Egyptian state should apply. This understanding will ensure that a Muslim can 
abandon Islam, have the abandonment acknowledged and not face civil death as a 
legal consequence. Moreover, this understanding will ensure that a citizen can 
express a dissenting religious opinion or even a reformist one and not be penalized for 
it and not be proclaimed an apostate by the court. This understanding is based on 
Islamic Shari’a, first and foremost, and is in accordance with the ICCPR. 
Consequently, the Egyptian State should fix its legal system and comply with Islamic 
Shari’a, its own national laws, as well as its obligations under international law.  
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